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INTRODUCTION

The dust has begun to settle. After dozens of decisions that
split the lower courts into insular camps, a sharply divided Supreme Court has decided Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.1 Over four
dissents, the Court held that in creating the private civil cause of
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),2 Congress did not limit the plaintiff class to persons
who allege "racketeering injury."3 The five Justice majority also
held that Congress did not limit the defendant class to persons
previously convicted under RICO's criminal provision or the predicate acts that establish the RICO violation.4 The Court's decision
1. 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
3. 105 S.Ct. at 3284-87. For a discussion of RICO "racketeering injury," see infra
notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 3281-84. The Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor
joined Justice White's majority opinion. In an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, Justice Marshall dissented from the majority's holding concerning the
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is expected to produce a new tide of "civil RICO" litigation.
By breathing new vitality into civil RICO, Sedima may quiet
some of the immediate questions that have surrounded this cause
of action ever since private plaintiffs began to discover its potential
reach in 1981. A '5more vexing question, however, persists in today's
"age of statutes," when the judiciary routinely must determine the
meaning of imprecise legislation. In the crucible of adversary litigation, federal courts determine legislative meaning by interpreting statutory language and legislative history. How shall a court
proceed when it reaches "equipoise" after concluding, as Judge
Harry T. Edwards recently defined, that competing arguments
drawn from the record and pertinent legal materials are "equally
strong"? e
Because of the sheer volume of legislation that finds its way to
the courts, the question of equipoise holds continuing relevance.
The "statutorification" of American law7 has reached the furthest
corners of our national life, and today a sizable percentage of litigation concerns dispute about the meaning of statutes. The scope
of dispute is as broad as the scope of legislative activity itself.
Sedima resolved two recurrent disputes that affect the fundamental question of access to judicial redress. One dispute concerns
the claim that in creating a private civil cause of action, Congress
limited "statutory standing" to exclude plaintiff, and persons similarly situated, from membership in the plaintiff class." A related
plaintiff class. Justice Marshall concluded that because his analysis would have led to dismissal of the RICO claims at issue, he "[did] not need to decide" whether the majority was
correct in its holding concerning the defendant class. Id. at 3304 n.2. Justice Powell filed a
dissenting opinion that likewise criticized the majority's holding concerning the plaintiff
class without reaching its holding concerning the defendant class. Id. at 3288.
In a companion case, the Court affirmed per curiam a Seventh Circuit decision that it
viewed as consistent with its Sedima opinion. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v.
Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). Justice Marshall submitted his Sedima dissenting opinion, again joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell. Id. at 3292.
5. See generally G. CALABREsi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
6. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current
Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 390 (1984).
7. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 1.
8. E.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
105 S. Ct. 1459, 1462-65 (1985) (Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act); Bread Political
Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 580-85 (1982) (Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100-09
(1979) (Fair Housing Act of 1968).
As a limit on the exercise of judicial power, standing operates at both the constitutional
and statutory levels. To have constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy article II's
case-or-controversy requirement. The "core component" requires allegation of "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed
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dispute concerns the claim that Congress excluded defendant, and
persons similarly situated, from membership in the defendant
class.9 In either circumstance, the court must determine whether
Congress created a broad class advanced by one party or a narrower one advanced by another.
Civil RICO litigation is an apt vehicle for examining the way
courts reach this determination once they conclude, in the exercise
of judgment, that statutory interpretation produces equipoise.1 0 In
the five years before Sedima, lower courts struggled to determine
the contours of civil RICO's litigant classes. Courts analyzed statutory language and legislative history but could not agree about
their meaning. They analyzed legislative purpose but could not
agree about what that purpose was. Some courts even analyzed the
context in which Congress acted but could not agree about what
that context was. The utter confusion, reflected in the Supreme
Court's own sharp division, suggests that in their deliberations,
many judges were considerably less certain about legislative meaning than their written opinions ultimately demonstrated. Courts
might have arrived not at a determination of meaning but at
equipoise.
When a federal court resolves equipoise in its effort to determine the contours of a litigant class created by an express private
cause of action, the court should consider the control that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, taken as a whole, exercise on the
conduct of litigation. With civil RICO as background, part II
presents this thesis and discusses the circumstances in which procedural control would be an element supporting a determination
by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984) (citing Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982)). Constitutional standing also embraces several judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, including the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights and the requirement that the complaint fall within the zone
of interests protected by the law invoked. Id. at 3324-25.
When this Article discusses determination of the plaintiff class, the focus is on statutory
standing. A person has statutory standing if the person is within the plaintiff class created
by the statute. E.g., National Conservative Political Action, 105 S. Ct. at 1462-65.
9. E.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1253-55 (1984) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615,
622-26 (1981) (Labor Management Relations Act).
10. The terms "statutory interpretation" and "statutory construction" are synonymous in current usage. R DicKERsoN, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

283 (1975). Some writers, however, have drawn a distinction. "Interpretation" is the process
of determining the meaning of the language itself, while "construction" includes the process
of determining whether a statute otherwise clear in its express meaning should be applied to
situations not clearly falling within it. Id. at 283-84.
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that Congress created a broad litigant class. Implicit in the notion
of equipoise is the threshold recognition that when a court engages
in statutory interpretation, it exercises judgment that might affect
the outcome and thus make law. This recognition did not come
quickly or easily to mainstream jurisprudence, and even today the
role of judgment in judicial decisionmaking is a subject of spirited
public discussion. Part III surveys American legal thought about
judicial decisionmaking from the early years of the Republic until
judgment and judicial lawmaking won general recognition in this
century. To amplify the Article's thesis, parts IV and V focus on
civil RICO decisions that struggled to determine the litigant classes before the sharply divided Supreme Court spoke in Sedima.
Part IV compares the courts' disparate determinations, which show
how the sources of legislative meaning sometimes may be so contradictory or otherwise unilluminating that they leave a judge at
equipoise. Part V isolates civil RICO procedural holdings to
demonstrate the control that the Rules exercise on the conduct of
litigation.
II. EQuIpoiSE AND ITS RESOLUTION
A.

The "Serious Business" of Sedima

Sedima's lineage reaches back as far as 1967, when the Katzenbach Commission called on Congress and the states to "make a
full-scale commitment to destroy the power of organized crime
groups."" Three years later Congress enacted the Organized Crime
Control Act (OCCA), 12 Title IX of which was entitled Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, dubbed "RICO." According
to the Senate Report, RICO's purpose was to "eliminat[e] ... the
infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." 13
RICO authorizes the government to move against defendants
in criminal prosecutions, 14 civil proceedings, 1 or both. It also au11. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION]. For a discussion of RICO's origins, see Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction

in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982).
12. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended in various sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. (1982)).
13. S.REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4007.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (b) (1982).
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thorizes private plaintiffs to sue and recover treble damages and
costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees."0 The foundation of this
Article is the express private cause of action, called "civil RICO"
here in accordance with the shorthand adopted by most
commentary.
The name of Title IX-Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations-suggests that the roll of civil RICO defendants would
include primarily organized-crime figures, but events have put this
suggestion firmly to rest. Few organized-crime figures have ever
been named as civil RICO defendants. 17 By 1981, however, private
plaintiffs began to discover that broad interpretation of RICO
would enable them to assert a civil RICO claim in nearly any fraud
action. 8 Plaintiffs have asserted civil RICO claims against such
nonracketeer defendants as banks,' 9 law firms, 2 0 Big Eight accounting firms, 2' insurance companies, 22 and securities and invest-

ment firms. 3 Individuals and corporations large and small have
not been immune. Neither have the Ku Klux Klan, 4 Church of
26
Scientology, 25 or Comptroller of the Currency.

As plaintiffs began to aim civil RICO at nonracketeer defen16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
17. An American Bar Association task force found that of the 270 pre-1985 district
court civil RICO decisions, 40% involved securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% "allegations of criminal activity of a type generally
associated with professional criminals." Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the
ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law 55-56 (1985), cited in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 n.16 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
18. Of the 270 pre-1985 district court civil RICO decisions, 3% were decided in the
1970's, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984.
ABA Report, supra note 17, at 55, cited in Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3277 n.1.
19. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291
(1985).
20. See, e.g., King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
21. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508,
509 (1983).
22. See, e.g., Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich.
1983).
23. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,674 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1984); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp.
667 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
24. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
25. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass.
1982).
26. Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1983).
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dants, many courts limited membership in one or both litigant
classes by statutory interpretation. Standing was limited to persons alleging "competitive," "racketeering," or similarly labeled injury. The defendant class was limited to persons connected with
organized crime or previously convicted under RICO or the predicate acts that establish the RICO violation.28
A profound split of authority emerged between courts that
limited one or both litigant classes and courts that declined to
limit one or both. In its Sedima decision in mid-1984, a Second
Circuit panel accurately stated the law when, after attempting to
synthesize the more than 100 civil RICO decisions then reported, it
concluded that "there is simply no consensus on what RICO requires. 1 9 A common thread did join courts on each side of the judicial divide-their written opinions parsed statutory language and
legislative history, and each side found support in these sources for
its conclusion.
Throughout much of our history, mainstream American jurisprudence viewed the legislature as the sole lawmaking organ in
cases such as Sedima, which require statutory interpretation.
Courts found and declared preexisting meaning but did not make
law themselves. For at least the past fifty years, however, it generally has been recognized that courts possess the capacity to make
law when they render decisions. In statutory decisionmaking, the
judicial role is subordinate, confined to the ascertainment and application of legislative meaning. The capacity for judicial lawmaking exists, however, because statutory interpretation necessarily includes exercising the sort of judgment evident in civil RICO
27.
28.
29.
Ct. 3275

See infra notes 156-92 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-245 and accompanying text.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
(1985). The profound split of authority was nowhere more apparent than in the

Second Circuit itself. On July 25, 1984, a divided panel decided Sedima, which limited civil
RICO's plaintiff class to persons alleging "racketeering injury" and its defendant class to
persons previously convicted under RICO or the predicate acts. 741 F.2d at 496, 503. A day
later a different divided panel limited civil RICO to plaintiffs alleging "a distinct RICO
injury." Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and re-

manded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). A day after Rhoades a third panel unanimously disagreed
with the Sedima and Rhoades majorities and reaffirmed the views of Judge Richard J.
Cardamone, the dissenter in those cases. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 525 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). The Furman panel

held that civil RICO did not require allegation of a "separate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury" but concluded that it was "compelled" to affirm dismissal of the complaint on
the authority of the two earlier decisions. 741 F.2d at 525, 533. The prior-conviction limit
was not reached in Rhoades, id. at 516 n.5, and was not before the Furmanpanel, id. at 52627.
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decisions.
Once the capacity for judicial lawmaking achieved wider recognition in this century, attention turned to the proper place of
that lawmaking within our constitutional framework. Holmes and
Cardozo instructed that judges rightfully legislate, but only "interstitially," or "between gaps" in the legal fabric.30 Cardozo's classic
1921 lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Process not only defended judicial legislation but also acknowledged that "often there
are no gaps." 3 ' Some statutes are fixed in their meaning. 32 Others
contain language and legislative history that carry sufficient imprecision to permit colorable arguments by adversary litigants, but
statutory interpretation ordinarily produces a prevailing argument
that satisfies the court that it has ascertained the meaning most in
accord with the record and pertinent legal materials. Only in "occasional and relatively rare instances," as Cardozo stated, does
"[o]bscurity of statute" 3 or other authority lead to the overriding
doubt and even equipoise that civil RICO might have produced in
judges' minds. In these instances, according to Cardozo, "the serious business of the judge begins."3 4 With a nod to Cardozo, Harry
Jones has spoken of "serious business" cases, in which "the rule
can be set, and justified with all traditional case-law proprieties,
either way."3 5 Cardozo estimated that serious-business cases comprise about ten percent of a typical docket,36 a figure corroborated
by some writers3 7 but viewed as too low by others. 8
30. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."); B. CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) (The judge "legislates only between gaps. He fills
the open spaces in the law.").
31. B. CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 129.
32. An example is the statute that establishes district court filing and miscellaneous
fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1982).
33. B. CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 128.
34. Id. at 21. ("It is when the colors do not match, when the references in the index
fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that the serious business of the judge begins.").
35. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1038-39 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Jones, Invitation];see also Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective
of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 803 (1961).
36. "Nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a court are predetermined-predetermined in the sense that they are predestined-their fate preestablished by
inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death." B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
60 (1924).
37. See, e.g., Clark and Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 256 n.7 (1961); Edwards, supra note
6, at 390 (five to fifteen percent).
38. See, e.g., K LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 25 n.16
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Most twentieth century writers conclude that judges may resolve equipoise by exercising essentially legislative discretion. 9
Cardozo was influential in articulating this traditional view. In the
third of his 1921 lectures, entitled "The Judge as a Legislator," he
offered this comparison between the roles of judges and legislators:
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be
guided by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is
legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for the
judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces
in the law. . . .None the less, within the confines of these open spaces and
those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps
its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but
40
made. The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom.

H.L.A. Hart expanded on Cardozo's discretion model a generation ago. 41 Statutes, Hart began, are "verbally formulated general
rules. 4 2 They produce decision in ordinary cases, but the legal system recognizes that "there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. ' 43 Beyond the borderline of legal rules lies "open texture, 4 4 which is
"the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in any
form of communication concerning matters of fact."4' 5 When a
court ventures into open texture, for example when "resolving the
uncertainties of statutes, ' 46 it has "discretion '47 to make "a fresh
choice between open alternatives. ' 4 The court may engage in "cre(1960) (suggesting about twenty percent); Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become
Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222 n.23 (1961); Jones, Invitation, supra note 35, at 1038-39 ("On
any account of the judicial process, even the most conservative, there is a substantial incidence of [serious-business cases]. Whatever this incidence may be-a fifth, a fourth, or a
third-it is indisputable that judicial decision-making involves, at certain times anyway, the
inescapability of choice between alternatives ....
"); Sneed, The Art of Statutory Interpretation, 62 TEX. L. REv. 665, 686 (1983) ("More frequently than one would like, neither [statutory language or legislative history] nor the briefs of the parties adequately identify the
legislative will.").
39. See Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/DworkinDispute, 75 MICH. L. REv. 473, 507 n.115 (1977); see also P, DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 30 (1977) ("[T]he notion of judicial discretion has percolated through the legal community . . ").
40. B. CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 113-15.
41. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961).
42. Id. at 123.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 124.
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 132.
47. Id. at 124, 132.
48. Id. at 125.
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ative or legislative activity, '49 subject to standards51 that are central
to the system 50 but that are not part of the law.
Ronald Dworkin has challenged the view that judges may exercise essentially legislative discretion in cases in which, for example, statutory interpretation does not produce decision. 52 Dworkin
maintains that law consists not only of "rules" such as statutes,
but also of "principles." A rule dictates the decision in an "all-ornothing fashion. '53 When no applicable rule exists, principles
merely "incline a decision one way, though not conclusively. '54 In
"hard cases"--"when no settled rule dictates a decision either
way" 55-the court must identify relevant principles, evaluate their
relative weight and importance, and decide according to the principle that "best justifies settled law."5' A principle's weight and importance depends on the extent to which it enjoys "a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and the public over
time. ' 57 Because principles are part of law as Dworkin conceives
it, 55 he denies the existence of interstices, gaps, or open texture
that would permit courts to exercise discretion on matters of law.59
49.

Id. at 131.

50.

Id. at 141-42.
51. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
612-14 (1958).
52. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967), reprinted in LAW,
REASON & JUSTICE 3 (G. Hughes ed. 1969) and as Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Summers ed. 1968); Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HAv. L.
REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin, Hard Cases]; Dworkin, Social Rules and
Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855 (1972). A collection of these and other essays appears in R.
DWORKIN, supra note 39. See also Dworkin, "NaturalLaw" Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165
(1982); Dworkin, Seven Critics,11 GA. L. REV. 1201 (1977); Dworkin, JudicialDiscretion,60
J. PHIL. 624 (1963).
53. R. DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 24, 35. As examples of rules, Dworkin offers, "The
maximum legal speed limit on the turnpike is sixty miles an hour" and "A will is invalid
unless signed by three witnesses." Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 35. As an example of a principle, Dworkin offers, "No man may profit from
his own wrong." Id. at 26. Dworkin distinguishes principles from policies: "Arguments of
principle are arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are
arguments intended to establish a collective goal." Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 52, at
1067. Only in cases of "special urgency" may decisions be based on policy. R. DWORKIN,
supra note 39, at 84, 92, 96-97.
55. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 52, at 1060.
56. R. DWORKIN,supra note 39, at 283.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 28-39.
59. Id. at 32-69.
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B. Resolving Equipoise in the Determination of a Litigant
Class
When a court reaches equipoise in its effort to determine the
contours of a statutory litigant class, the court must look beyond
statutory language and legislative history to determine whether
Congress previously created a broad class advanced by one party
or a narrower one advanced by another. Among other sources, the
court should consider the control that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, taken as a whole, exercise on the conduct of litigation.6 0
Because equipoise places the court in open texture, Hart's formulation would permit the court to consider procedural control to
guide the exercise of essentially legislative discretion. Under Dworkin's formulation, procedural control would lay claim to status as a
principle enjoying a time-honored sense of appropriateness derived
from the positive reception that the bench and bar have accorded
the Rules ever since their adoption in 1938; the court would evaluate the weight and importance of procedural control in relation to
the weight and importance of other extant principles. Under either
formulation, procedural control remains relevant to resolution of
60. Because the court is charged with determining the litigant class that Congress previously created, consideration of procedural control in the resolution of equipoise does not
transgress the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). That Act provides in part that
the Rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." Id. Nor does this
consideration transgress Rule 82, which provides in part that the Rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." FED. R. Civ. P.
82. The court at equipoise has concluded that statutory language and legislative history do
not permit determination of the previously created class. Consistent with historically developed notions about legislative supremacy and the judiciary's constitutional role, the court
must determine the class by exercising essentially legislative discretion or by evaluating the
relative weight and importance of extant principles. In either event, the court does not begin
with a clean slate, but rather determines meaning from among ascriptions within the inarticulate statute's interstices or gaps. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
For example, civil RICO provides a private cause of action in favor of "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see infra note 152. Before
the Supreme Court's Sedima decision, lower courts might have resolved equipoise by concluding, for example, that Congress limited (or did not limit) the plaintiff class to persons
alleging "racketeering injury" to their business or property. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text. A fundamentally different matter would have been presented, however, if
a court purported to resolve equipoise by concluding that the plaintiff class included persons alleging personal injury. Cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir.
1984) (§ 1964(c) does not create right to recover for personal injury), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). Because RICO's language and legislative history
do not reasonably suggest that Congress created a private right of action to recover for
personal injury, expansion of the plaintiff class to encompass that injury would constitute
judicial activity beyond RICO's interstices or gaps and thus would amount to primary lawmaking, which is the province of Congress.
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equipoise because substance and procedure do not operate in mutually exclusive vacuums. Each affects the other and reflects legislative judgments about the nature of legal rights and obligations
and the way they should be determined and enforced. The Rules
are held to have statutory effect, and they expressly apply to
causes of action, such as civil RICO, that Congress creates without
prescribing procedure.6 1 The Rules, as a whole, provide the frame61. The Rules are held to have statutory effect because under the Rules Enabling Act,
a rule or amendment becomes effective only with congressional approval or acquiescence. 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982); see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941); United States ex
rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
971 (1966); Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1964); Nordmeyer
v. Sanzone, 315 F.2d 780, 781-82 (6th Cir. 1963). The Enabling Act occasioned some early
scholarly dispute about whether Congress had the power to prescribe rules of federal practice and procedure. Compare Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for JudiciaryProcedure are
Void Constitutionally,23 ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928), reprintedin 20 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 159 (1936)
(retitled Legislature Has No Power in ProceduralField) with Beardsley, Legislative Regulation of Procedure Not Unconstitutional, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 115 (1940). Contemporary
courts and commentators, however, generally agree that this power resides in Congress. E.g.,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. at 9-10; see
also W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND PossmLITIES 38-39 (1981). The Enabling Act delegated the power to the Supreme Court, which acts on advice from the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). The Court prescribes rules and
amendments, which the Chief Justice reports to Congress. A rule or amendment may not
take effect until 90 days after the Chief Justice's report, though the Court may specify this
or a later effective date. Id. § 2072. Congress may permit a rule or amendment to become
effective by taking no action, it may reject or amend the rule or amendment, or it may defer
effectiveness. If Congress defers effectiveness, it eventually may allow the rule or amendment to take effect, may reject or amend it, or may enact its own rule or amendment. See
W. BROWN, supra at 5-8.
Congress may create a cause of action such as civil RICO and provide for its assertion
by procedure that supersedes the Rules in whole or part. Supersedure would be consistent
with the canon of statutory construction that a subsequent statute modifies a prior one on
the same subject. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (C. Sands
4th ed. 1972). The Supreme Court has held, however, that congressional intent to supersede
the Rules must be "direct" and "clear." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979); see
also In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1134 n.50 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The Califano holding is in accord with the canon of statutory construction that implied repeal of a statute is not found in the absence of a "clear and manifest" legislative
intent to repeal. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (quoting United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 45657 (1945).
In nearly a half century, Congress apparently has enacted legislation superseding the
Rules in only one minor instance. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 n.22 (1969 & Supp. 1985) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER]. The almost universal approach, taken in the enactment of the OCCA, is
to create a private right of action but remain silent about procedure in the statutory language and legislative history. In accordance with Rule 1, the Rules and the case law applying them govern. FED. R. Cirv. P. 1 (with exceptions not relevant in civil RICO actions, the
Rules govern procedure "in all suits of a civil nature" in the district courts); see also United
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work for achieving the general legislative goal, expressed in Rule 1,
of securing "just, speedy, and inexpensive" civil determinations. 2
Civil RICO demonstrates the often conflicting considerations
that operate in equipoise cases in which the court must determine
the contours of a litigant class created by Congress. Courts endeavored to reach "just" determinations about whether Congress had
limited civil RICO to certain potential plaintiffs (for example, persons alleging "racketeering injury"), or to certain potential defendants (for example, persons connected with organized crime). At
the same time, courts recognized that the scope of civil RICO's litigant classes might affect the caseload and thus affect judicial ability to secure "speedy" and "inexpensive" determinations.
Resolution of equipoise is likely to result in either overinclusion or underinclusion, each with its own effect on these often conflicting considerations. Because certain persons will be members of
both a broad and a narrower litigant class, the result depends on
the "swing" persons-those who would be members of the first
class but not the second. If the court defines a broad class, it concludes that a just determination makes private redress available
against a broad range of conduct. Breadth increases the possibility
of including conduct outside the inarticulate Congress' intendment, but it decreases the possibility of excluding conduct within
that intendment. Breadth also might swell the dockets and impede
efforts to maintain efficiency conducive to speed and inexpensiveness. On the other hand, definition of a narrower class might advance efficiency by reducing the dockets, but it would restrict
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964).
62. FED. R CIV. P. 1 The rulemakers increasingly have called on courts to assume a
managerial role that directly exercises control over the conduct of civil litigation. E.g., FnD.
R. Civ. P. 16 (pretrial conferences; scheduling; management); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (discovery
conference).
63. See, e.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Congress
deliberately cast the net of liability wide, being more concerned to avoid opening loopholes
through which the minions of organized crime might crawl to freedom than to avoid making
garden-variety frauds actionable in federal treble-damage proceedings-the price of eliminating all possible loopholes. . . . We must abide by Congress's decision, made at a time of
less sensitivity than today to the workload pressures on the federal courts . . . . however
much we may regret . . . the burdens that the decision has cast on the federal courts
...
") (citations omitted). Compare Terre du Lac Ass'n v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 601 F. Supp.
257, 261 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (adopting prior-conviction limit on defendant class, with observation that contrary holding would "have a severe effect on the court's dockets") with Maxwell
v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 (D. Kan. 1984) (rejecting prior-conviction
limit, with observation that it "reflect[s] a well-intentioned attempt to slow the growing
burden which civil RICO cases have placed on federal court dockets already laden with
backlogs of cases").
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availability of private redress and increase the risk of excluding
some conduct within congressional intendment.
In the resolution of equipoise, consideration of efficiency requires more than examination of caseload projections. A broad litigant class indeed might increase the caseload, a circumstance that
judges recognize should not be taken lightly.14 Equipoise cases,
however, invite not only the potential of that increase but also the
potential of excluding conduct from private redress. Consideration
of efficiency requires recognition that commencing a civil action is
not a license to proceed at will. Under both the Hart and Dworkin
formulations, the court rightfully may consider the reality that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control the conduct of litigation
because a party may litigate and proceed to judgment only by complying with their prescriptions. Some actions suffer dismissal for
noncompliance; others proceed, but only according to these prescriptions. Litigation involving one or more swing persons thus
would be controlled by, and proceed in accordance with, prescriptions that Congress previously has approved for the orderly determination of civil actions. In equipoise cases in which private redress against a broad range of conduct otherwise is considered just,
procedural control thus would be an element supporting a determination that Congress created a broad litigant class.
III. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT: THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL
JUDGMENT ON LEGISLATIVE MEANING

Implicit in the notion of equipoise is the threshold recognition
that when a court engages in statutory interpretation, it exercises
judgment that might affect the outcome and thus make law. Until
this century, however, mainstream American jurisprudence perceived the separation of powers as establishing a bright line of demarcation between the legislative and judicial functions. Members
of Congress were "lawmakers," and courts were "law interpreters." 65 Congress made law by enacting statutes within boundaries
staked out by the Constitution. Courts interpreted statutes, but
64. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Edwards,
The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy"of the Federal Courts:A CausationBased Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871 (1983); McCree, BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777 (1981); McGowan,
The View from an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 659 (1982); see also supra note 63
and accompanying text.
65. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962), overruled on other grounds,
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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only to discover and declare preexisting meaning. According to this
traditional scheme, statutory interpretation did not require exercise of judgment that would create a capacity for judicial
lawmaking.
The difficulty with the traditional scheme lies in the simple
truth that judicial decisions do not announce themselves. The Supreme Court begins statutory interpretation with analysis of statutory language,66 followed by analysis of legislative history, either to
determine which plausible meaning Congress intended or to reaffirm a plain meaning.17 No matter how neatly the formula is articulated, however, statutory interpretation requires what Justice
William J. Brennan recently called "the interaction of reader and
66. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 104 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1984); American Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337
(1979)); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981).
67. The plain meaning rule formerly precluded analysis of legislative history once statutory language was found to yield a plain meaning. E.g., United States v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) ("[W]here the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended. And in
such cases legislative history may not be used to support a construction that adds to or
takes from the significance of the words employed."); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917); Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419, 421 (1899).
The plain meaning rule evoked sustained criticism for establishing an inherently unreliable method of ascertaining legislative meaning. "The notion that because the words of a
statute are plain, its meaning is also plain," Justice Frankfurter inveighed, "is merely pernicious oversimplification." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Judge Learned Hand warned that "[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally." Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (L.
Hand, J., concurring), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945). Judge
Hand called on courts "not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739
(2d Cir.), af/'d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). Years later, Justice Roger J. Traynor warned that
"[p]lain words, like plain people, are not always so plain as they seem." Traynor, No Magic
Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAIiF. L. REv. 615, 618 (1961).
Some voices, however, have urged courts to eliminate or restrict resort to legislative
history. They argue that legislative history is ordinarily a dubious source of meaning whose
value is outweighed by the costs it imposes on litigants and courts. See, e.g., Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); R.
DIcKERSON, supra note 10, at 137-97.
Today the Supreme Court examines legislative history even after it finds that statutory
language yields a plain meaning. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 658, 663 (1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3011
(1984). When the Court finds "clear evidence" of a "clearly expressed legislative intention
... contrary" to plain language, it stands ready to implement that intention. E.g., Bread
Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 581 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980), and Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
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text."6 8 This interaction necessarily requires exercise of judicial
judgment. The impact of this human ingredient on final resolution
varies from case to case; nevertheless, this ingredient is usually
present, as it was in civil RICO litigation, because only rarely does
language or legislative history hold meaning amenable to mechanical ascertainment or application.
Even when words are carefully chosen, language suffers from
at least some imprecision as a method of communication. Justice
Frankfurter offered these insights on the intrinsic difficulties of interpreting statutory language:
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning ....

The prob-

lem derives from the very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But
unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols, with shifting variables, their configuration
can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured definiteness2

Legislative history also invites imprecision because, to a large
degree, it measures subjective intent.70 A court examines legislative
history to ascertain the intent of particular legislators who enacted
the statute whose meaning the parties placed in dispute. Especially
when that history appears murky, courts frequently consider the
legislation's broader purpose or the context in which the legislature
acted.7 1 Even legislative history that appears instructive, however,
frequently contains the imprecision present in other circumstances
that require determination of subjective intent. If anything, the
imprecision inherent in determining one person's subjective intent
is magnified when the goal is to determine the subjective intent of
a collectivity such as a legislature.
The imprecision of language and legislative history is fortified
by the nature of the legislative process. The court's decision might
turn on a statute whose drafters did not foresee, and perhaps could
68. W. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification 1,
Presentation at Georgetown University Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985)
(available from Supreme Court of the United States Information Office).
69. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
528 (1947); see, e.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 34-53; Chafee, The DisorderlyConduct
of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 382 (1941) ("Words are the principal tools of lawyers and
judges, whether we like it or not ....

So we need to know more about their imperfec-

tions."); Jones, The PlainMeaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 3 (1939) ("A legislative direction must be expressed in
words, and words are notoriously inexact and imperfect symbols for the communication of
ideas.") (citation omitted).
70. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 10, at 67-86.
71. Id. at 87-136.
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not have foreseen, the statute's application to the facts at hand; it
might turn on a statute whose language or legislative history became saddled with internal inconsistencies on the run through the
legislative obstacle course; it might turn on a statute laden with
inadvertent imprecision; or it might turn on a statute whose drafters purposely avoided precision, either from a conviction that caseby-case judicial determination would serve the legislative purpose
best or from a sense that passing the burden of decision to the
courts would be less painful than facing the hard facts of political
72
compromise and accountability.
The confluence of language, intent, and legislative process may
produce a mosaic that resists ascertainment of legislative meaning
and its application to facts. In some cases, the strength of this resistance might leave the court at equipoise. For the judge who interprets a statute, then, the first step in decisionmaking is to seek
meaning in statutory language and legislative history. In this century mainstream jurisprudence has recognized a further step, the
capacity for judicial lawmaking created when the court's human
judgment intervenes during the deliberations.
A.

The Rise and Decline of the Oracular Theory

During most of the nineteenth century, dominant legal
thought embraced the oracular, or declaratory, theory-that courts
do not make law but merely find and declare preexisting, transcendent principles.7 3 The theory's name derives from Blackstone's
classic description of judges as "depositories of the laws; the living
72. On and off the bench, judges frequently point to inartfully drafted legislation as a
persistent cause of judicial lawmaking. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 6, at 425 ("Statutory
incoherence and vagueness... impose enormous burdens on the courts when trying to give
life to the legislature's language."); Friendly, Judicial Control of DiscretionaryAdministative Action, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 63, 69 (1970) ("[E]xperience . . .teaches that the degree to
which the courts can be expected to restrain themselves is a function of what other branches
of government do to avoid the need for interposition . . . ."); Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial
Activism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REv. 539, 547 (1981) (discussing "the murky, buck-passing brand of legislation that casts unwanted construction and
application burdens on the courts"); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1174 (1977) ("A Congress genuinely concerned about delegated power has one effective contribution that it, and only it, can make-the identification
and definition, as precisely as possible, of that power, and of the standards to be observed in
its exercise."); see also Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
668 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[O]ne might
wish that Congress had spoken with greater clarity ....");Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578, 595 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The effort to determine congressional
intent here might better be entrusted to a detective than to a judge.").
73. G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 2 (1976).
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oracles. . . bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the
land. '74 Blackstone viewed judicial decisions as the "principal and
most authoritative evidence" of law but not as law itself.75 In cases

requiring statutory interpretation, this view meant that law was
made solely by the legislature.
Blackstone's hold on early American legal thought is illus76
trated by the Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson,
which determined the role of state law in diversity actions for
nearly a century until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.77 Swift was
a commercial dispute heard in New York federal court between a
Maine plaintiff and a New York defendant. No New York statute
spoke to the commercial issue raised. The question for the Court
was whether the forum state's decisional law must be applied in
diversity actions. The answer turned on the 1789 Rules of Decision
Act: "[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision, in trials at
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply. 1 7 8 With Justice Story's opinion showing Blackstone's

profound influence,7 9 the unanimous Court held that the word
"laws" did not include judicial decisions. "In the ordinary use of
language," Justice Story wrote,
it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves,
laws .... The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules
74. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (Sharswood ed.
1871).
75. Id. Although Blackstone generally is recognized as the foremost exponent of the
oracular theory, Sir Matthew Hale had stated a similar theory in a work published posthumously in 1713, ten years before Blackstone's birth. M. HALE,THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (C. Gray ed. 1971) ("[T]he Decisions of Courts of Justice ... do not
make a Law properly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); yet they
have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and Publishing what the Law
of this Kingdom is ... ; and tho' such Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater
Evidence thereof than the Opinion of any private Persons .. .

76.

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
78. 1 Stat. 92 (1789), quoted in Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17 (emphasis added). With
minor changes in language, the Rules of Decision Act is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982).
79.

Blackstone's Commentaries profoundly influenced leading pre-Civil War judges,

including Story. See Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 731, 755-59 (1976). On the Commentaries'
influence in the United States generally, see L. FRIEDMAN,A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 8889, 98, 279-80, 285 (1973); W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME LESSONS FROM OUR LEGAL HISTORY 173-76
(1928); A. SUTHERLAND,THE LAW AT HARVARD 23-31 (1967).
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and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established local customs having the force of laws. s0

Pre-Civil War America remained content with the oracular
theory, even as common-law courts frequently assumed active roles
as catalysts of national economic development.8 ' For its part, the
Supreme Court invoked broad constitutional provisions, notably
the commerce and contract clauses, to reach decisions that made
as much law as any other decisions ever handed down by the
Court. 2 The oracular theory survived, one commentator suggested,
because most activist decisions reflected dominant values and thus
83
occasioned little sustained scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford8 4 momentarily shook the oracular theory at its moorings. The
Court was called on to decide whether Scott, originally a slave in
Missouri, had become free when taken into a free territory. The
majority held that he could not invoke diversity jurisdiction because he was not a "citizen." The Court reasoned that when the
framers drafted the Constitution, "the civilized portion of the
white race"8 5 held blacks to be "a subordinate and inferior class of
beings;" 88 to be "altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; 8 s7 to be possessed of "no
rights which the white man was bound to respect;"8 8 and to be
"treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it." ' Then the Court exposed its
political side to public view by reaching out to hold the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional. To broad segments of a nation irretrievably divided by slavery's moral and political questions, the
Justices appeared not as oracles declaring higher truths but as par80. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17.
81. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 1-4 (1977); see
also Dorfman, ChancellorKent and the Developing American Economy, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
1290 (1961).
82. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce clause); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (contract clause);

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally 4 A. BEvERIDGE, THE
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 220-39, 397-460 (1919).
83. White, The Path of American Jurisprudence,124 U. PA. L. REV. 1212, 1224 (1976),
reprinted in G. WHITE,PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 32 (1978).
84. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
85. Id. at 407.
86. Id. at 404-05.
87. Id. at 407.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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tisans delivering a stump speech. 0
After Appomattox, courts rebounded and continued their activism during the remainder of the nineteenth century. As statutes
became increasingly visible on the legal landscape, judges demonstrated a marked affinity for decisionmaking-by-axiom. A court
would begin by announcing an axiom whose universal truth would
be assumed without call for empirical analysis. The court then
would apply that axiom to the facts and reason by syllogism toward the seemingly inevitable conclusion. 9 ' Judges' uncritical embrace of axioms stemmed in part from the contemporary view of
law as a science consisting of principles grounded in logic and
found in the laboratory.92 Science or no science, however, "inevitable" conclusions in major cases increasingly seemed to favor railroad and industrial interests at the expense of remedial and social
legislation.
The Supreme Court's 1895 decision in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.,93 for example, concerned a challenge to the recently
enacted Sherman Act's proscription against monopolies in interstate commerce. The Court began with a terse axiom: "That which
belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United
States, but that which does not belong to commerce is within the
jurisdiction of the police power of the state. ' 94 From this major
90. G. WHITE, supra note 73, at 53; see also D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE
417-49 (1978); C. HAINES & F. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, at 430-32 (1957); 1 A. NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF
LINCOLN 96-118 (1950); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 30219 (1922); Swisher, Aftermath of the Scott Case, in 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 631-52 (P. Freund ed. 1974).
91. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 38, at 38.
92. The leading exponent of this view was Harvard's Christopher Columbus Langdell.
1 C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (2d ed. 1879) ("Law,
considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of
these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled
skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer .... "). In 1886 Langdell reiter-

ated that "[f]aw is a science," and that "all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books." A. SUTHERLAND,supra note 79, at 175; see also R. STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 51-64 (1983). Holmes,
however, dissented:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
93. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
94. Id. at 12.
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premise, the Court proceeded to distinguish commerce from manufacturing: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part
of it." 5 The Court needed only a few more pages to eviscerate the
Sherman Act by holding that its proscription against monopolies
in commerce did not apply to a company that manufactured more
than ninety percent of the nation's sugar.
The oracular theory and decisionmaking-by-axiom escaped
sustained intellectual criticism during the Gilded Age, when prevailing judicial attitudes about economic development and individual self-reliance reflected prevailing popular attitudes. The rise of
Progressivism in the first years of the twentieth century, however,
changed popular attitudes. As courts invoked broad constitutional
provisions to strike down legislation designed to ameliorate industrial displacement, suspicion grew that in the guise of declarers of
transcendent principles, judges frequently wrote their own policy
96
preferences into law.
On his retirement in 1897, Justice Stephen J. Field steadfastly
maintained that the Supreme Court "has indeed no power to legislate. . . . [I]t possesses the power of declaring the law, and in that
is found the safeguard which keeps the whole mighty fabric of government from rushing to destruction. 9 7 As the nineteenth century
yielded to the twentieth, however, a growing number of observers
no longer perceived judges as the passive oracles that Blackstone
had described more than a century before. As cases requiring statutory interpretation multiplied, judges occasionally justified their
own interpretations as avoiding "judicial legislation," 98 a phrase
that had little place in the judicial lexicon while the oracular theory held general acceptance. In the same year that Justice Field
spoke, Holmes pointed the way toward twentieth-century jurispru95. Id.
96. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA.L. REv. 999, 1002 (1972), reprinted in
G. WrTE, supra note 83, at 104.
97. Letter from Mr. Justice Stephen J. Field to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Oct. 12, 1897) (discussing his retirement from the Court), reprinted in Appendix, 168 U.S. 713, 717 (1897). Denial of lawmaking power remained a persistent theme of late-nineteenth-century judges. L. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 79, at 333. For example, Justice Field's colleague and nephew, Justice David
Brewer, maintained in 1893 that courts "make no laws,. . . establish no policy, .

.

. never

enter into the domain of public action. They do not govern. Their functions in relation to
the state are limited to seeing that popular action does not trespass upon right and justice
as it exists in written constitutions and natural law." E. CORwIN, THE TwILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT XXV (1934).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897).
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dence. Still five years away from assuming his own seat on the Supreme Court, Holmes decried the "fallacy ... that the only force
at work in the development of the law is logic."9 9 Anticipating both
Realism and Sociological Jurisprudence, he observed that "[y]ou
can give any conclusion a logical form"'10 0 and chastised judges for
having "failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage."'' 1 "Behind the logical form,"
Holmes wrote, "lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and
unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of
10 2
the whole proceeding.'
B.

The Emergence of Sociological Jurisprudence

Suspicion about judicial lawmaking created fertile ground for
Sociological Jurisprudence, the first twentieth-century intellectual
movement to challenge the oracular theory. Its leader was Roscoe
Pound, but the spark was Holmes' 1905 dissent in Lochner v. New
York. 0 s A state statute regulating the maximum hours of bakery
workers, the Supreme Court majority held, violated "liberty of
contract" guaranteed by fourteenth amendment due process.
Holmes rebuked the majority not only for engaging in flawed reasoning but also for failing to credit the emerging view that liberty
of contract was anachronistic when workers held little semblance
of equality in bargaining with their employers. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases," Holmes attacked decisionmaking-by-axiom. "The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise."' 1
Pound baldly asserted that "[1]aymen know full well that
Far from acting as passive ora[courts] may make laws . . ,.05
cles, he argued, judges "in practice tend to overturn all legislation
which they deem unwise. ' 1°6 Discussion of "judicial lawmaking," a
99. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).
100. Id. at 466.
101. Id. at 467.
102. Id. at 466.
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The decision, he continued, must be in accord
with "the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law." Id.
105. Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 610
(1907).
106. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) (citation
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phrase that Pound used openly, 10 7 became fashionable. In 1908 he
attacked decisionmaking-by-axiom for producing a "mechanical jurisprudence," many of whose "rules and decisions . . . , tested by
their practical operation, defeat liberty."10 8 By adjusting "principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern
rather than to assumed first principles," he wrote, Sociological Jurisprudence would "[put] the human factor in the central place
and relegat[e] logic to its true position as an instrument.' 1 9 Pound
urged courts to "seek the basis of doctrines, not in Blackstone's
wisdom of our ancestors, not in the apocryphal reasons of the beginning of legal science,. . . but in a scientific apprehension of the
relations of law to society and of the needs and interests and opin110
ions of society of to-day."
As the 1920's drew to a close, the Sociological Jurisprudents'
enduring contribution to American literature about judicial decisionmaking transcended their individual or collective writings.
They were a watershed, a link between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By arguing that decisionmaking should reflect the
contemporary situation, they argued that consistent with the Constitution's judicial power, courts may consider external stimuli and
thus exercise judgment that might affect the outcome. Moreover,
they argued that, consciously or unconsciously, American courts
had always exercised this judgment but that dominant legal
thought largely had overlooked this exercise."' This broader assault, sympathetically received during the Progressive years,
gravely wounded the oracular theory. Its demise occurred at the
omitted).
107. E.g., id. at 24; see also Pound, Spurious Interpretation,7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 380
(1907); B. CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 10 ("I take judge-made law as one of the existing
realities of life.").
108. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 616 (1908) (footnote
omitted).
109. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909).
110. Pound, supra note 105, at 610-11; see also Pound, The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24 H~Av. L. REv. 591 (1911), 25 HARv. L. REV. 489
(1912); Pound, Do We Need A Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUPA L. REv. 339, 344 (1905).
Pound's exposition of Sociological Jurisprudence evolved over time. In 1923, for example, he
qualified his earlier outright rejection of mechanical jurisprudence, concluding instead that
it held a rightful place in American law. He distinguished between cases concerning commercial transactions and property, which he said required certainty provided by mechanical

jurisprudence, and cases concerning the general welfare, which he said required flexibility
provided by Sociological Jurisprudence. Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision (pts. 1-3),
36 HARv. L. REv. 641, 802, 940 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Pound, Judicial Decision].
111.

See Pound, Judicial Decision,supra note 110, at 948 (Judges draw on "[c]urrent

moral ideas ... continually, although seldom consciously.").
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hands of the Legal Realists, who shared the view that courts exercise judgment but were more strident in their own assault on the
"myth" of oracular judging." 2
C. Legal Realism and Beyond
Throughout the 1920's a few writers took the oracular theory-that courts reason deductively from preexisting principles toward a conclusion-and stood the theory on its head. Max Radin,
for example, wrote that judges "act more frequently than otherwise
by discovering the desirable result first and ...

justify[ing] it, af-

terwards."" Influenced by the behavioral sciences, writers such as
Radin argued that psychology held the key to judicial behavior. A
decision, wrote Hessel E. Yntema, "is reached after an emotive experience in which principles and logic play a secondary part.""" To
determine whether a particular rule controls a decision, "we must
ultimately probe the purposes and the prejudices implicit in the
judge's reaction to the concrete case. '""5 Herman Oliphant
sounded the same theme, calling on scholars to shift their focus
from "the vocal behavior of judges in deciding cases" to "their
non-vocal behavior, . . . what the judges actually do when stimu-

lated by the facts of the case before them." 1 6 The new focus, he
"more a science of realities and less a theolsaid, would make1 law
7
ogy of doctrines. "

These voices presaged Legal Realism, whose emergence was
heralded by Karl Llewellyn in 1930. A loose collection of academic
112. J. FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

11-12, 33-34 (1930).

113. Radin, The Theory of JudicialDecision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.BA J. 357,
359 (1925). "If... we could rid ourselves of the personal interest in [a controversy]," he
advised advocates, "we might shrewdly guess that a great many judges would like to see the
same person win who appeals to us." Id. at 359; see also Haines, General Observations on
the Effects of Personal,Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17
ILL. L. REv. 96, 104 (1922) ("Approval is here given to the type of judge who looks at the
equities of a cause and then searches for precedents to sustain the desired results.").
114. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480
(1928).
115. Id. at 481; see also Haines, supra note 113, at 104-05 ("Just as is the case with
other opinions of individuals, judicial opinions necessarily represent in a measure the personal impulses of the judge, in relation to the situation before him, and these impulses are
determined by the judge's lifelong series of previous experiences.") (footnote omitted);
Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of JudicialOpinions, 6 CALIF. L. REv. 89 (1918) ("Judicial acts may... be expressive of emotional tones or values, and of emotional associations
acquired in past experiences.").
116. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 ABA. J. 71, 159, 161 (1928) (emphasis in
original).
117. Id. at 159.
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writers whose most prominent spokesmen were Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, Realism dominated American jurisprudence throughout much of the 1930's. Its model of judicial decisionmaking
seemed like judgment and lawmaking run rampant. Llewellyn argued that decisions turned not on "paper rules" found in books
but on "real rules" that explained how courts actually decided
cases. 18 Frank dissected the decisionmaking process this way in
his provocatively entitled Law and the Modern Mind:
The process of judging. . . seldom begins with a premise from which a
conclusion is subsequently worked out. Judging begins rather the other way
around-with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily
starts with such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find premises which will
substantiate it ....
[S]ince the judge is a human being and since no human
being in his normal thinking processes arrives at decisions. .. by.. . syllogistic reasoning, it is fair to assume that the judge, merely by putting on the
judicial ermine, will not acquire so artificial a method of reasoning. Judicial
judgments, like other judgments, doubtless, in most cases, are worked out
backward from conclusions tentatively formulated. 119

According to Frank, decisionmaking was an essentially idiosyncratic process that the judge's own political, economic, and social biases often influenced.' 2 0 The operation of "the personal element in court justice" was "inescapable.''
Frank's behavioral
model of decisionmaking was attacked by Pound 22 but supported
118. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLuh. L. REv. 431,
448 (1930); see also Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7
(1934) ("[T]he theory that rules decide cases seems for a century to have fooled not only
library-ridden recluses, but judges."); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1237 (1931).
119. J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 100-01 (footnote omitted).
120. According to Frank,
the judge's sympathies and antipathies are likely to be active with respect to the
persons of the witness, the attorneys and the parties to the suit. His own past may have
created plus or minus reactions to women, or blonde women, or men with beards, or
Southerners, or Italians .... A certain twang or cough or gesture may start up memories painful or pleasant in the main.
Id. at 106.
Cardozo had expressed a similar thought in his 1921 lectures:
[Tihe forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and content of their
judgments ... are seldom fully in consciousness ....
Deep below consciousness are
other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man,
whether he be litigant or judge .... The great tides and currents which engulf the
rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 167-68.

121. Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 23 (1931).
122. See Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REv. 697, 704-06
(1931).
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by Realists, 2 ' including a district judge who had vouched for its
accuracy in 1929. Joseph C. Hutcheson had confided that a judge
"really decides by . . . 'hunching' and not by ratiocination, and
that ratiocination appears only in the opinion.' 124 "[T]he vital,
motivating impulse for the decision," Judge Hutcheson explained,
"is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong,"'12 5 followed
by a
26
search for authorities that "support [the] desired result.'
The New Deal, according to Justice Harlan F. Stone, brought
"days of facile legislation.'1 2 7 For Realists to address the effect of
judicial judgment on statutory interpretation, then, was only natural. Radin argued that because a statute is a "general statement
[that] describes a general situation . . ., [i]t can be extended
pretty widely and contracted pretty narrowly." If the judge is "a
little clever," he advised, the statute "will catch or let out the situation you are deciding.' 2s Frank concurred. "Except in those cases
which happen to be explicitly covered by the code," he wrote in
1930, "the judicial interpreter takes out of the code provisions ex129
actly what he puts in.'
In 1936 Justice Stone announced that American legal thought
was on the verge of assimilating the dominant strains of Sociological Jurisprudence and Realism. "We are coming to realize more
completely," he wrote,
123. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
124. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
125. Id. at 285.
126. Id. at 286. Thirty-two years later, Judge Hutcheson sought to explain that in his
earlier article he
undertook, in a personal sort of way to make the point that, while a judge may not
completely reject settled, that is established, law merely because he does not like the
results of its application to a particular case, he has the right, indeed the duty to make
use of all lawful expedients supporting him in the result he desires to reach and announce ....
Hutcheson, Epilogue, 71 YALE L.J. 277, 278 (1961).
127. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1936).
128. Radin, supra note 113, at 360-61; see also Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARv. L. REV. 863, 884 (1930) ("What is desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what
satisfies the social emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of society which he
entertains.").
129. J. FRANK, supra note 112, at 191. After Frank assumed a seat on the Second Circuit in 1941, he took a more restrained view. See, e.g., Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,
620-21 (2d Cir. 1944) ("Courts in their interpretation of statutes often cannot avoid some
• . .legislation . . . .That activity should always, of course, be modest in scope. But the
necessary generality in the wording of many statutes, and ineptness in the drafting of
others, frequently compels the courts, as best they can, to fill in the gaps. . . .") (footnote
omitted), aff'd sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
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that ... within the limits lying between the command of statutes on the one
hand and the restraints of precedents and doctrines . . . on the other, the
judge has liberty of choice of the rule which he applies, and that his choice
will rightly depend upon the relative weights of the social and economic advantages which will finally turn the scales of judgment in favor of one rule
essentially the function of
rather than another. Within this area he performs
80
the legislator, and in a real sense makes law.

The Realist ascendancy was short-lived. Barely a decade after
its heralded emergence in 1930, Realism was on the defensive, a
decline that has been attributed to two external influences, the
1937 Court-packing battle and the totalitarian threat before and
during World War II.' By appearing to portray judges as free
agents, Realism invited association with the unsuccessful effort to
add members to the Supreme Court, an initiative that emanated
from an essentially Realist interpretation of judicial decisionmaking.132 By appearing to define law as whatever idiosyncratic
lawmakers said it was, Realism invited association with incipient
enemies of the American system as war clouds hovered. 133
In apparent reaction to the Realist model of idiosyncratic
judging, the Legal Process school surfaced during World War II
and reached fuller expression throughout the 1950's. This school
recognized that courts exercise judgment and participate in lawmaking but called on judges to restrain lawmaking through reasoned opinions whose articulated analysis would demonstrate the
thought processes that led to the result.
Dean Erwin N. Griswold summarized the tenets of the Legal
Process school in 1960.'13 Because "human judgment is an inevitable element in the application of law,"' 35 he began, "it is clear that
judges do 'make law,' and have to do So. '' 136 Echoing the Realists,
130. Stone, supra note 127, at 20.
131. See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism
and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 282-83 (1973), reprintedin G. WHITE, supra note 83,
at 139-40.
132. See generally E. CORWIN, supra note 97.
133. E.g., E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 316 (1940) ("preparing the intellectual
ground for a tendency toward totalitarianism"); Harris, Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence, 10 TUL. L. REv. 169, 179-81 (1936); Pound, Disappearanceof the Law, 2 ALA. LAW.
363, 368, 378-79 (1941). See generally L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
134. Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart and Judge Arnold,
74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960); see also Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957); Hart, Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 99 (1959); Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953
Term: Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 99-100 (1954); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
135. Griswold, supra note 134, at 92.
136. Id. at 94.
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Griswold acknowledged that "it is far from easy for the human
mind to avoid result-oriented decisions,' 37 and recognized that
judges "have convictions, predilections, even prejudices. 1 3' The
Legal Process school called on judges to "put these things aside, or
at least to make a determined effort to hold them in check,

' 13 9

and

reach decisions, "as far as humanly possible, on intellectually valid
40
and disinterested grounds.'

As Griswold wrote, the Legal Process school's call for reasoned
elaboration faced the stern test of Warren Court decisionmaking.
Popular debate about the Warren Court was reflected in scholarly
writing. When the Chief Justice retired in 1969, for example, Alexander Bickel upbraided the Court for having "relied on events for
vindication more than on the method of reason for contemporary
validation.''

A year earlier Judge J. Skelly Wright had lauded

the process that Bickel found objectionable. "[T]he Warren Court
has not simply decreed the right results," the Judge concluded,
"but. . .it was right to have decreed them. Its active role in shap14 2
ing our society has been a necessary and proper one."'

Throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's, litigants have advanced claims of constitutional or statutory right in such volatile
areas as public school desegregation, affirmative action, abortion,
and church-state relations. The courts' involvement has fueled the
ongoing debate about the nature of judicial decisionmaking. The
Attorney General, for example, recently expressed the Reagan Administration's standard for selecting nominees to the federal
bench. "We

. .

.want people," he said, "who have.

. .

an under-

standing that the function of a judge is to interpret the law, not to
1 43
make the law.'
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 91.

141. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 12 (1970) (1969
Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School).
142. Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1968).
143. Reagan Seeks Judges With "TraditionalApproach," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 14, 1985, at 67 (interview with Edwin Meese III, Attorney General). Other members of
the Administration have expressed similar views. Speaking about the Constitution and its
Framers, for example, Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds said that
"Article 1 ... concerns the Legislative branch, which was alone to make the law .... And
Article 3 . . .concerns the Judicial Branch, which was designed to interpret the law." W.
Reynolds, Remarks at the American Jewish Committee Learned Hand Award Dinner 5
(Jan. 23, 1985) (available from United States Department of Justice).
From another perspective, the Critical Legal Studies movement has examined basic in-
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Our jurisprudential heritage, however, demonstrates recognition that when a court engages in interpretation, it must exercise
judgment that might affect the outcome and thus make law.
Judges are not slot machines dispensing preordained results, but
rather human actors who reason toward a conclusion. In a case requiring statutory interpretation, it is true that the court first might
conclude that the record and pertinent legal materials hold particular meaning but then consciously might reject that meaning for
one that accords with the court's own predilections. As the Attorney General suggests, conscious lawmaking would invite charges
that the court usurped legislative power. A court might conclude,
however, that because of limits inherent in language, intent, or legislative process, a statute is sufficiently imprecise to support more
than one plausible meaning and to require ascertainment of the
meaning most in accord with the record and pertinent legal materials. The court might be required to fill interstices or gaps before
applying the imprecise statute to the facts; reasonable minds might
differ concerning which competing ascription of meaning prevails.
Even if the court remains within the confines of the subordinate
judicial role, some measure of lawmaking is inevitable. In a small
percentage of cases, a court might conclude that the legislature's
signals appear so contradictory or otherwise unilluminating that
they produce equipoise, requiring the court to exercise discretion
or evaluate principles.
Justice John Paul Stevens recently expressed the contemporary perception of judges as neither free agents nor automatons.
"[T]he repeated need to add new stitches in the open fabric of our
statutory . . . law," he wrote, "foreclose[s] the suggestion that
judges never make law. ' 14 4 "[E]very practicing lawyer," he exstitutions, including the courts, since the late 1970's. E.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies and Constitutional
Law: An Essay in Deconstruction,36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984). See generally CriticalLegal
Studies Symposium, 36 STAN.L. REV. 1 (1984).
144. Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JuDIcATuRE 177, 180 (1982).
Contemporary judges generally have recognized judicial participation in the lawmaking process. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 628 (1963) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[E] very scholar knows that judges who construe statutes must of necessity legislate interstitially ...."); Aldisert, What Makes a Good Appellate Judge?, 22 JUDGES' J. 14, 16-17
(1983) ("To adjudicate properly, a judge must sometimes legislate, but judicial legislation is
only a means to an end."); Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 765 (1965) ("It
is now a commonplace that courts, not only of common-law jurisdictions but also those
which have codified statutory law as their base, participate in the lawmaking process.");
Edwards, supra note 6, at 388; Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and

1506

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1477

plained elsewhere, "knows that the judgment of human beings-[including] the judgment of judges-determines the precise
meaning of our law as it is applied in countless situations. Rules of
law constrain and guide the exercise of judgment in our legal system . ...
IV.

POINT-COUNTERPOINT: JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF CIVIL

RICO's

LITIGANT CLASSES

[A] civil RICO complaint must allege "a distinct RICO injury".
We regard this as the plain meaning of § 1964(c), and we see no basis for
inferring that Congress did not intend what it plainly said.
- Second Circuit, July 26, 1984146
[T]he language of § 1964(c) is clear ....
[I]t grants civil relief for "injury", which logically includes any injury, "by reason of a violation of § 1962"
[C]ongress intended to provide the victims with the private civil RICO
remedies ... for all injuries caused by the defendant's conduct.
- Second Circuit, July 27, 1984147

Before the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision in Sedima,
did civil RICO produce equipoise in the minds of judges called on
to determine the contours of a litigant class? To be sure, observers
occasionally speculated that a few courts abandoned the search for
legislative meaning and limited membership in one or both classes
by conscious lawmaking.1 48 Whether and to what extent legislative
Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 787, 798 (1963) ("[fIn dealing . . . with ...
imperfect statutes .... judges perform quite useful work and do a certain amount of lawmaking... ."); Kaufman, The Anatomy of Decisionmaking,53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1984)
("[Clollective political bodies that create law must, of necessity, accept that there will be
some judicial additions to or modifications of the work they have produced."); McGowan,
supra note 64, at 664 ("[I]nevitable gaps ... in the reach of statutes, as well as express
statutory language in some cases, leave [the courts of appeals] with large 'lawmaking' responsibilities.... ."); Peters, Common Law Judgingin a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 995, 998 (1982) ("[J]udicial lawmaking must take statutes into account virtually all of the time.") (footnote omitted); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHL L. REV.
3, 4 (1966) ("It is generally agreed that judges make law and that it is inevitable that they
should do so."); Traynor, Reasoning in a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 742 (1970)
("Paradoxically, the more legislators extend their range of lawmaking... at a hare's speed,
the more significant becomes the judge's own role of lawmaking . . .at the pace of the
tortoise.").
145. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
146. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and
remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
147. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985) (emphasis in original).
148. E.g., A RICO Crisis, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, 30 (calling Second Circuit
Sedima decision a "classic example of result-orientitis").
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directive "constrains and guides" a court in its exercise of judgment, however, is to some degree a matter of conscience. Unless a
court announces a meaning at odds with ordinary understanding,
critics are apt to find that reading judges' minds is no easier than
reading anyone else's. By comparing the disparate interpretations
reached by civil RICO courts, this part IV cannot disprove speculation that a few civil RICO decisions abandoned the effort to ascertain and apply legislative meaning. The imprecision that permeates civil RICO, however, demonstrates how courts sometimes
reach equipoise in the age of statutes while striving to exercise
judgment in accordance with the model of legislative supremacy.
While reviewing a criminal RICO conviction in United States
v. Turkette,1 49 the Supreme Court reiterated the formula for ascertaining legislative meaning: "In determining the scope of a statute,
we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.' ,15o
Civil RICO, which the Seventh Circuit has likened to a "treasure hunt,' 1 51 is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. The treasure
hunt begins with section 1964(c), which creates a private cause of
action in favor of "[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962. ' 152 Section 1962, in turn,
makes it unlawful for "any person" to engage in a "pattern of racketeering activity" while holding any of various relationships enumerated in that section with an "enterprise" engaged in or affect1 53
ing interstate commerce.
149. 452 U.S. 576 (1980).
150. Id. at 580 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); see also Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983) (quoting
Turkette in action involving 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1), RICO's forfeiture provision); supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
151. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides in full:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
RICO defines "person" to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
153. Subsection (a) of § 1962 in essence makes it unlawful for any person to establish,
operate, or acquire an interest in an enterprise by using or investing income derived directly
or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity. Subsection (b) in essence makes it unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity, to acquire or maintain
directly or indirectly an interest in or control of an enterprise. Subsection (c) in essence
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A person engages in "racketeering activity," according to section 1961(1), by committing any of more than two dozen "predicate acts."' 154 Certain of these predicate acts-for example, "any
act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, [or]
robbery"-might well be committed by persons generally labeled
"racketeers." But nonracketeers routinely commit at least three
other predicate acts-any "indictable" act of mail fraud or wire
fraud, and "any offense involving ...
fraud in the sale of
securities."
The final step in the civil RICO treasure hunt is to find a
"pattern" of racketeering activity. According to section 1961(5), a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) afmakes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with an enterprise to conduct or
participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity. Subsection (d) makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the first three subsections. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). RICO defines "enterprise" to
include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1982).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides that "racketeering activity" means:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which
is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections
2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29,
United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to
labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or
(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale
of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any
law of the United States.
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ter the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."' 5 5
Together with legislative history, this statutory language provided the basis for determining who may sue or be sued under civil
RICO. Courts focused not only on words and documents but also
on context and legislative purpose. Before the Supreme Court itself split five to four in Sedima, the search for legislative meaning
had approached the end of the road with few answers in sight.
A.

Determining the Plaintiff Class

Many courts held that by creating a private right of action in
favor of "[a]ny person injured. . . by reason of a violation of section 1962,' 156 Congress limited civil RICO standing to plaintiffs
who alleged something more than injury from defendant's commission of at least two predicate acts. Some courts embraced an antitrust analogy that limited standing to plaintiffs alleging "competitive" injury. 157 When the Supreme Court narrowly rejected a
"racketeering injury" limit in Sedima,158 courts were closely di155. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added). For the text of § 1964(c), see supra
note 152.
157. Decisions that required allegation of competitive injury include Bankers Trust
Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S.
Ct. 3550 (1985); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983); Erlbaum v.
Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,772, at 93,923 (E.D. Pa. July
13, 1982), appeal dismissed, 709 F.2d 1491 (3d Cir. 1983); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v.
Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (N.D. IMI.1980). Most decisions rejected the competitive
injury requirement. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494-96 (2d Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287-88 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d
1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d
1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded en banc, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162,
165 (D.D.C. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580-81 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 476, 493-95 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 47, 49-50 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,742, at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
158. 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284-87 (1985). At the least, the Court in Sedima rejected the
racketeering-injury limit on the plaintiff class and the prior-conviction limit on the defendant class. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. The Court also cast doubt, however,
on the continued vitality of the other limits discussed in part IV of this Article. In rejecting
the racketeering-injury limit, the Court expressed confusion about whether the Second Circuit also had meant to limit the plaintiff class to persons alleging antitrust-type injury. 105
S. Ct. at 3284. Because it held that injury from the predicate acts themselves is sufficient to
establish injury under RICO, the Court concluded that it "need not pinpoint the Second
Circuit's precise holding." Id. at 3285. The Court did say in a footnote, however, that civil
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159
vided on whether Congress had created that limit.

RICO damages "include, but are not limited to, . . . competitive injury." Id. at 3286 n.15.
In rejecting the prior-conviction limit, the Court approved use of civil RICO against the
Sedima and Haroco defendants in the absence of any suggestion that they were connected
with organized crime. Sedima concluded that "Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate'
and 'illegitimate' enterprises .

. .

. The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for

criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences." Id. at 3287 (citation omitted). The
Third Circuit has held that this conclusion rejects the organized-crime limit on the defendant class. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940, 942 (3d Cir. 1985).
To the extent that doubt remains, the competitive-injury and organized-crime limits
appear doomed by this guidance that the Sedima majority provided to lower courts:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously
expansive language and overall approach,. . . but also of its express admonition that
RICO is to "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes". . . . The statute's "remedial purposes" are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private
action for those injured by racketeering activity ....
RICO was an aggressive initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new
methods for fighting crime .

. .

. While few of the legislative statements about novel

remedies and attacking crime on all fronts . . . were made with direct reference to
§ 1964(c), it is in this spirit that all the Act's provisions should be read.
105 S. Ct. at 3286 (citations omitted); see also id. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("By constructing such a broad premise for its rejection of the 'racketeering injury' requirement, the
Court seems to mandate that all future courts read the entire statute broadly."). The Court
also has read the statute broadly in its two criminal RICO decisions. See Russello v. United
States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
159. Decisions that required allegation of "racketeering," or similarly labeled, injury
include Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded,
105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415,
1427-30 (D. Or. 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983); In re
Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen,
571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal.
1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc. 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Van
Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D. Mass. 1982);
Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772, at 93,922
(E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982), appeal dismissed, 709 F.2d 1491 (3d Cir. 1983); Landmark Sav. &
Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Decisions that declined to require allegation of "racketeering," or similarly labeled, injury include Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd per curiam, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing
Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 568-69 (N.D. Cal. 1984); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec.
Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434-37 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162,
166-67 (D.D.C. 1983); Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 278-79 (D. Md.
1983); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %98,742, at 93,737 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).
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1. The Antitrust Limit
(a) Reasoning of Courts That Adopted the Antitrust Limit
Emphasizing that the language of section 1964(c) closely
tracks that of section 4 of the Clayton Act,'6 0 some courts held that
Congress limited civil RICO standing to plaintiffs alleging injury
that placed them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. The Supreme Court has held that to recover treble damages
under section 4, plaintiffs must prove "antitrust injury, . . . injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent."' 16
Some courts held that to recover treble damages under civil RICO,
plaintiffs also were required to prove antitrust injury.
Courts found support for the RICO competitive-injury limit in
the legislative history. After the Katzenbach Commission in 1967
suggested using civil antitrust remedies against organized crime,' 6 2
two bills were introduced in the Senate to amend the antitrust
laws to reach organized crime's infiltration into legitimate business. 6 3 Congress ultimately abandoned these bills and enacted
RICO as Title IX of the OCCA, but some courts concluded that
the antitrust influence remained. When RICO's chief sponsor summarized the proposed legislation on the House floor, he stressed
the efficacy of antitrust. 6 4 The OCCA's statement of findings and
purpose expressed concern that "organized crime activities in the
United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm. . . competing organizations, interfere with free compe160.

See supra note 152 for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). When RICO was enacted,

§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provided in pertinent part
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee ....
Congress amended § 4 in 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 4 (b), 94 Stat. 1156; and in 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-393, § 4(A)(1), 96 Stat. 1964. Neither amendment is pertinent to the present
analysis.
161. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (emphasis
in original).
162. PRESIDNmr's COMMISSioN, supra note 11, at 208 ("Civil proceedings could stop
unfair trade practices and antitrust violations by organized crime businesses.").

163. See Blakey, supra note 11, at 253-56.
164. 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff) ("[P]rivate persons injured
by reason of a violation of the title may recover treble damages in Federal courts-another
example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality.").
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tition, [and] seriously burden interstate and foreign
1165
"...
commerce .
(b) Reasoning of Courts That Rejected the Antitrust Limit
Most courts rejected the competitive-injury limit as contrary
to RICO's language and legislative history. These courts acknowledged the similarity between the language of section 1964(c) and
that of the Clayton Act; however, they concluded that by providing
a cause of action in favor of any person "injured in his business or
property," without further restricting the type of injury, section
1964(c) encompassed private proprietary injury that had no impact
on the plaintiff's ability to compete or on competition itself. 6'
These courts concluded that Congress enacted RICO outside
the antitrust sphere because it intended to create a private cause
of action not limited to business or commercial plaintiffs who alleged competitive injury. Drawing from statements of the OCCA's
chief sponsors 167 and from the Act's statement of findings and purpose,16 8 courts held that Congress aimed at evils that transcended

antitrust objectives. Some courts moved a step further, concluding
that an antitrust limit overlooked the distinction between RICO's
purposes and the purposes of the antitrust laws. Antitrust is
designed to promote competition and increasingly is concerned
with market efficiency rather than harm suffered by individual
businesses; RICO, in contrast, is designed to inflict severe economic injury on violators and perhaps to destroy them. 169
Some courts stressed that Congress abandoned early proposals
to amend the antitrust laws shortly after the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section advised in 1969 that "use of antitrust
laws themselves as a vehicle for combating organized crime could
165. 84 Stat. 923 (1970); see Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d
511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
166. For the text of § 1964(c), see supra note 152. See also Bankers Trust Co. v.
Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550

(1985).
167. E.g., 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("There is ... no
intention here of importing the great complexity of antitrust law enforcement into this
field.").
168. The statement recited that "organized crime activities ... harm innocent investors,. . . threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation
and its citizens . . . ." 84 Stat. 923 (1970).
169. E.g., Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580
(E.D. Mich. 1983).
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create inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage reThe Section's report
"1o70
covery. . . such as 'standing to sue' ...
advised that "[b]y placing the antitrust-type enforcement and discovery procedures in a separate statute," Congress would avoid "a
commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating competition. . . ."171 Limiting civil RICO to plaintiffs who
alleged competitive injury, the courts concluded, would ignore congressional intent to avoid that limit.
2.

The "Racketeering Injury" Limit

(a) Reasoning of Courts That Adopted the "Racketeering
Injury" Limit
Courts that limited civil RICO's plaintiff class to persons alleging "racketeering," or similarly labeled, injury advanced two
major grounds to support this limitation. The first ground was the
language of section 1964(c), which creates a private cause of action
in favor of "[a]ny person injured . . . by reason of a violation of
section 1962."172 This language, which some courts found "ambiguous,"1 73 was held to require allegation of injury from the pattern of
racketeering activity prescribed in section 1962 and not merely injury from defendant's commission of predicate acts.1 74 A Second
Circuit panel reasoned: "If a plaintiff's injury is that caused by the
predicate acts themselves, he is injured regardless of whether or
not there is a pattern; hence he cannot be said to be injured by the
pattern, and the pattern cannot be said to be the but-for cause of

the injury.

"175

The second ground borrowed the antitrust analogy but de170. 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969); e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 495
(2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 531 (2d Cir.
1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1432 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
171. 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added). For the text of § 1964(c), see supra
note 152.
173. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 3275 (1985).
174. E.g., 741 F.2d at 494 & n.38; Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 517 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); see also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at
3292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
175. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d at 517 (emphasis in original).

1514

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1477

parted from it. As indicated above, plaintiffs suing under section 4
of the Clayton Act must allege "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent.' 17 6 Many courts held that because
section 1964(c) closely tracks the Clayton Act's language, Congress
meant for civil RICO plaintiffs to allege injury of the type RICO
was intended to prevent, usually called "racketeering injury" or
something similar. 17 To identify this injury, some courts focused
on legislative purpose. They concluded, as Justice Marshall later
expressed in his Sedima dissent, that RICO's "principal target was
the economic power of racketeers, and its toll on legitimate businessmen. To this end, Congress sought to fill a gap in the civil and
criminal laws and to provide new remedies broader than those already available ....,,178 Justice Marshall concluded that Congress
limited civil RICO's plaintiff class to persons alleging "RICO injury-injury to their competitive, investment, or other business interests resulting from the defendant's conduct of a business, or infiltration of a business or a market, through a pattern of
'7 9
racketeering activity.'
(b) Reasoning of Courts That Rejected the "Racketeering
Injury" Limit
Most courts that rejected a "racketeering injury" limit held, as
the Supreme Court ultimately did, 80 that RICO's plain language
required allegation only that the defendant committed at least two
predicate acts within ten years.' These courts began with section
176. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see supra
notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
177. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,495 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.
Ct. 3275 (1985); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983);
Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 564 F.
Supp. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 100708 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125,
1136 (D. Mass. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); see also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3299 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Sedina, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985); Landmark Say.
& Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
179. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 3285 ("There is no room in the statutory language for an... amorphous
'racketeering injury' requirement.").
181. E.g., Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th
Cir. 1984), afl'd per curiam, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); EconoCar Int'l, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (D. Mass. 1984); In re
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1964(c), which authorizes an action by "[a]ny person injured...
"
A defendant violates
by reason of a violation of section 1962. 1182
section 1962, they continued, by engaging in a "pattern of racketeering activity" while holding an enumerated relationship with an
enterprise. 183 RICO defines "racketeering activity" to mean the
predicate acts,18 4 and a "pattern of racketeering activity" requires
commission of at least two acts of "racketeering activity" within
the prescribed time period. 18 5 These courts acknowledged, as the
Supreme Court's narrow majority ultimately stated, that "RICO is
evolving into something quite different from the original concep"does not
tion of its enactors"; 86 that evolution, they concluded,
87
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.'
These courts found RICO's legislative history consistent with
the statutory language. In Furman v. Cirrito a Second Circuit
panel concluded that a racketeering-injury limit ignored "the
larger purposes of RICO.' 88 The primary purpose may have been
to reach organized crime, the panel reasoned, but Congress recognized that fraud was a pervasive societal problem that caused billions of dollars in economic loss each year. RICO includes predicate acts routinely committed by nonracketeers and "provide[s] no
exception for businessmen, for white collar workers, for bankers, or
for stockbrokers."' 8 9 To the Furman panel this breadth indicated
that Congress "wanted"'' 9 0 RICO to reach nonracketeers.' 91
Most courts did not emphasize that Congress had legislated in
so broad a context. They concluded that Congress aimed at racketeers, recognized that RICO's broad language might reach nonracketeers, but determined that this breadth was a price worth paying
in the effort to reach the intended target. These courts reasoned
Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1437 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D.D.C. 1983); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581
F. Supp. 88, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 279

(D. Md. 1983).
182. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), see supra note 152.
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); see supra note 153.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); see supra note 154.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
186. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
187. Id. (quoting Haroco, Inc., 747 F.2d at 398).
188. 741 F.2d at 528.
189. Id. at 529.
190. Id. at 530.
191. According to the panel, Congress recognized that "fraud is fraud, whether it is
committed by a hit man for organized crime or by the president of a Wall Street brokerage
firm." Id. at 529.
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that if civil RICO plaintiffs were required to allege racketeering
injury rather than defendant's mere commission of at least two
predicate acts, some direct victims might be denied private redress.
Moreover, some racketeers might evade regulation, a result con192
trary to congressional intent.
B.

Determining the Defendant Class

The difficulties courts encountered in determining civil
RICO's plaintiff class were mirrored in their efforts to determine
the defendant class. Several district courts held that Congress limited the defendant class to persons connected with organized
crime, 193 a holding rejected by the courts of appeals 4 and most
district courts' 95 that considered the issue. In Sedima the Second
192. E.g., Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984); Econo-Car
Int'l, Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (D. Mass. 1984); Swanson
v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
193. E.g., Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984); American Say. Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Colo. 1984);
Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp.
712, 715 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 642-44 (C.D. Cal.
1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358-62 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,032, at 94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Noonan v.
Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale
Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp.,
526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
194. Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20-21 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-56 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d
449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 106364 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
195. E.g., Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 n.1 (D.S.C. 1984); Wilcox v.
Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561, 568 (N.D. Cal. 1984); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and
Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1426-30 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 99,674, at 97,712 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
1984); Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1425-26 (D. Or.
1984); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (D.D.C. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec.
Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp.
667, 680-82 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719-20 (D.D.C. 1983);
Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1578-80 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565
F. Supp. 476, 490-93 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill.
1982); D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 229-31 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Mauriber v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen
Energy Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, at 93,737
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Circuit held that Congress limited the defendant class to persons
previously convicted under RICO or the predicate acts, 9 ' a holding
that split the lower courts 19 7 before the Supreme Court's narrow
majority rejected it.98

1. Reasoning of Courts That Adopted the Organized-Crime
Limit
Most courts that limited civil RICO to organized-crime defendants acknowledged or assumed that the statutory language did
not impose that limit. 99 The courts found in the legislative history,
however, "a clearly expressed legislative intent . . . contrary" to
the statutory language.2 00 These courts concluded that Congress
(N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
196. 741 F.2d at 503.
197. Decisions that adopted the Second Circuit holding include Spinelli, KehiayanBerkman, S.A. v. Imas Gruner, A.I.A. & Assocs., 602 F. Supp. 372, 376-77 (D. Md. 1985);
Viola v. Bensalem Township, 601 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Bernstein v. Bank
Leumi Le-Israel B.M., 598 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Southgate Bank v. Public
Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 601 F. Supp. 262, 263-64 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Berg v. First Am.
Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 505-06 (D.D.C. 1984). Decisions that rejected the Second
Circuit holding include Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton and Co., No. 84-3276 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 1985)

(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Poling v. Morgan, 598 F. Supp. 686, 690 (D.
Ariz. 1984); Ora Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.S.C. 1984); Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 254-56 (D. Kan. 1984); Grado v. Gross, [1984 Transfer
Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,660, at 99,337 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984).
Before the Second Circuit decided Sedima, the prior-conviction limit had been rejected
with little or no discussion by courts that had considered it. E.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); Hudson v. LaRouche, 579 F.
Supp. 623, 626 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 270-71
(W.D. Okla. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Barker v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1982); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240,
241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 646-47 (N.D.
I1. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1279-80 (D. Del. 1978).
198. 105 S. Ct. at 3281-84.
199. E.g., Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D. Mass. 1984); American Say. Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp. 888, 889 (D. Colo. 1984); Saine
v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (D. Colo. 1984); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F.
Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 217 (D. Colo. 1983);
Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
99,032, at 94,912 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
200. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); see supra notes 66-67, 149-50
and accompanying text.
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clearly expressed an intent that civil RICO operate against only
organized crime. Some courts found the committee hearings, 0 1
floor debates, 0 2 and committee reports 0 3 replete with concern
about organized crime. A few courts also emphasized a portion of
the OCCA's statement of findings and purpose: "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged

in organized crime. "204
These courts were unmoved by Congress' failure to limit civil
RICO expressly to organized-crime defendants. They concluded
that in the context in which RICO was enacted, legislative silence
was a persuasive indication of intent to establish that limit. RICO
includes the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes in its list of predicate acts.20 5 Because courts consistently had held that these expansive statutes do not afford implied private rights of action,20 6
201. E.g., Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30, S.974, S.975...
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("In varying degrees, most
of our larger metropolitan areas are beset with the problem of organized crime") [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings];id. at 150 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) ("The target presented
by organized crime . . . is elusive").
202. E.g., 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) ("[T]itle IX is aimed
at removing organized crime from our legitimate organizations."); id. at 602 (remarks of Sen.
Hruska) ("Title IX ... is designed to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business by attacking its property interests and by removing its members from control
of legitimate businesses which have been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering
methods."); id. at 603 (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) ("[RICO] is designed to root out the
influence of organized crime in legitimate business, into which billions of dollars of illegally
obtained money is channeled ...."); id. at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd) ("[RICO] constitute[s] a carefully structured program which can drastically curtail-and eventually eradicate-the vast expansion of organized crime's economic power ... ."); id. at 819 (remarks of
Sen. Scott) (OCCA's "purpose is to eradicate organized crime in the United States"); id. at
845 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("[T]itle IX... may provide us with new tools to prevent
organized crime from taking over legitimate businesses and activities."); id. at 953 (remarks
of Sen. Thurmond) ("[R]acketeers are very much interested in gaining inroads into legitimate business . . . ."); id. at 35,199 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("a truly full-scale commitment to destroy the insidious power of organized crime groups").
203. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text.
204. 84 Stat. 923 (1970); e.g., Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); see supra note 154 and accompanying text.
206. E.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1979) (mail
fraud); Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th
Cir. 1974) (wire fraud), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); see also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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courts reasoned that broad interpretation of RICO would displace
vast areas of federal and state law. "It is implausible," wrote Judge
Pollack in Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,20 7 "that Congress could
have meant to alter this accepted rule to the extent of creating a
right of action for treble damages without a single mention of such
' 208
a revolutionary consequence anywhere in the legislative history.
Once these courts found clearly expressed legislative intent to
limit civil RICO to organized-crime defendants, they effected that
intent. A few courts cited Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States,0 9 in which the Supreme Court, declining to apply a statute
according to its plain meaning, held that "a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. '210 Judge
Pollack was more direct in Moss. RICO did not define "organized
crime," he concluded, because
by its very nature, "organized crime" is not susceptible to a clear, concise
definition. [But] [1legislative failure to establish a "bright line" does not imply that Congress intended that Courts repudiate their proper function of
legislative interpretation and application. The Courts are routinely called on
to apply general criteria on a case by case basis.

. .

especially.

. .

where the

underlying subject matter is not well suited to simple definition. 1 '

2.

Reasoning of Courts That Adopted the Prior-Conviction
Limit

In its Sedima decision the Second Circuit limited civil RICO's
defendant class to persons previously convicted under RICO or the
predicate acts.2 12 The Sedima panel noted that although section
207. 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
208. 553 F. Supp. at 1361; see also Minpeco, S.A., 558 F. Supp. at 1350 ("strains credibility" to conclude that Congress, "without comment or explanation," intended civil RICO
to create treble-damage private right of action for offenses that previously did not provide
private rights of action); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 753 (N.D.
I1. 1981) ("[Hiad Congress intended to turn all securities fraud actions into treble damage
suits, it would have, at the very least, given some indication of that purpose.").
209. 143 U.S. 457 (1892), quoted with approval in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
210. 143 U.S. at 459; e.g., Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D.
Mass. 1984); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 217 (D. Colo. 1983); Wagner v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH)

99,032, at 94,912

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
211. 553 F. Supp. at 1359.
212. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985).
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1964(c) closely tracks section 4 of the Clayton Act, the sections are
not worded identically. The panel emphasized an "instructive" difference."" Section 4 permits suit by "[a]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws"; 214 section 1964(c) permits suit by "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962." '215 The panel found it plausible that Congress
used the word "violation" in the latter section "with a specific intent. . to require that conviction at least of the predicate acts be
had" before a civil RICO action could be brought. 2 6 The panel observed that section 1961(1) includes only predicate acts that are
"chargeable," "punishable," or "indictable. ' 21 7 "All these terms,"
wrote Judge Oakes, "speak along criminal rather than civil
lines."2 18
Citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,1 9 the
Sedima panel viewed civil RICO as "a classic case of a statute
whose ambiguous language need[ed] to be construed in light of
Congress's purpose in enacting it. 21 20 As it reviewed the legislative
history, the panel "[found] nothing conclusive, but discern[ed] in
the legislative silence a purpose . . . entirely at odds with [an]
open-ended reading."' 22' The panel concluded that Congress, when
it considered the bill that became RICO, "was not aware of the
possible implications of section 1964(c). 2 22 Finding that RICO's
"general purpose" was to "combat organized crime," 223 the panel
reasoned that "had Congress considered"2 24 the problems created
by an open-ended reading, it would have advanced the general
purpose by establishing a prior-conviction limit on the defendant
class.2 25
213. 741 F.2d at 498.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (emphasis added). For the text of § 4, see supra note 160.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added). For the text of § 1964(c), see supra
note 152.
216. 741 F.2d at 498-99.
217. Id. at 499. For the text of § 1961(1), see supra note 154.
218. 741 F.2d at 499.
219. 143 U.S. 457 (1892); see supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
220. 741 F.2d at 488 & n.17.
221. Id. at 503.
222. Id. at 492.
223. Id. at 487; see also Southgate Bank v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 601 F.
Supp. 262, 264 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Bernstein v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M., 598 F. Supp. 922,
925 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
224. 741 F.2d at 501.
225. Judge Oakes' majority opinion posed various problems, each of which the Supreme Court later held insufficient to justify the proposed limit. 105 S. Ct. at 3283-84. Judge
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Reasoning of Courts That Rejected the Proposed Limits on
the Defendant Class

Courts rejecting the proposed limits on civil RICO's defendant
class held these limits to be contrary to the plain statutory language. The courts held an organized-crime limit to be contrary to
section 1962, whose four subsections each operate against "any
person," and section 1961(3), which defines "person" to include
"any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property. '226 "It is the violation of the statute which
22 7
controls," one court concluded, "not the status of the violator.
Courts held a prior-conviction limit to be contrary to section
1964(c), which authorizes an action by any person injured in his
business or property by reason of a "violation" of section 1962, and
to section 1961(1), which includes only predicate acts that are
"chargeable," "punishable," or "indictable. ' 22 As one district
court explained its disagreement with the Second Circuit's Sedima
decision, "[a] person 'violates' a law at the time he does what the

law forbids, not when he is convicted of doing

So. ''229

Concluding

Oakes wrote that absent a prior-conviction limit a plaintiff would be required to prove defendant's commission of the predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby requiring the
court to instruct the jury about different standards of proof in different aspects of the same
case. 741 F.2d at 501-02. Civil RICO also would raise "serious constitutional questions" because it "would provide civil remedies for offenses criminal in nature, stigmatize defendants
with the appellation 'racketeer,' authorize the award of damages which are clearly punitive,
including attorney's fees, and constitute a civil remedy aimed in part to avoid the constitutional protections of the criminal law." Id. at 500 n.49.
226. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1961(3) (1982) (emphasis added); see supra notes 152-53; see
also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509
(1983); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1428 (E.D.
Pa. 1984); Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (D. Or.
1984); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983); Austin v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667, 670 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Lode v. Leonardo,
557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Il. 1982); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
227. Lode, 557 F. Supp. at 680.
228. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c), 1961(1) (1982); see supra notes 152, 154; see also Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO
Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982); Grado v. Gross, [1984
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 91,660, at 99,335 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1984); Ora
Corp. v. Vinson, 596 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (D.S.C. 1984); Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank,
593 F. Supp. 250, 254-55 (D. Kan. 1984); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty,
513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
229. Grado, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RFP. (CCH) 91,660, at 99,335; see
also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281 ("[T]he term 'violation' does not imply a criminal conviction
....
It refers only to a failure to adhere to legal requirements.") (citation omitted).
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that "[i]f Congress had intended to require a prior conviction it

could have easily said

So,112 °

these courts anticipated the Supreme

Court's holding that RICO "racketeering activity consists not of
has been convicted, but of acts for
acts for which the defendant
23
which he could be." 1
These courts also concluded that Congress did not intend to
limit the defendant class to persons connected with organized
crime or previously convicted. Courts recognized that RICO was
intended to strike at organized crime, but they stressed that Congress rejected suggestions that RICO be limited expressly to defendants whose behavior smacked of organized criminal activity.
Some courts noted that because proving organized-crime membership traditionally had been difficult and often impossible, Congress
feared that an express limit would enable racketeers to evade regulation.2 32 Courts also noted that Congress feared that an express
limit might lead courts to strike down RICO for creating an unconstitutional status offense.233
These courts concluded that Congress was aware that certain
of RICO's predicate acts were broad enough to reach nonracketeers. The Attorney General, for example, told the House Judiciary Committee that the OCCA contained provisions that "do not
relate solely to organized crime. 23 4 The Association of the Bar of
230. Ora Corp., 596 F. Supp. at 1548.
231. 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
232. E.g., Maxwell v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 593 F. Supp. 250, 255 n.2 (D. Kan. 1984)
(quoting Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95
HARv.L. REV. 1101, 1107-09 (1982)); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig.,
583 F. Supp. 1388, 1429 & n.60 (E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp.
255, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 681-82 (N.D.
Ga. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 491-93 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Windsor Assocs., Inc.
v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Md. 1983); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy
Resources Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,742, at 93,736-37 (N.D.
Ohio June 11, 1982).
233. In addition to the cases cited supra note 232, see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.,
719 F.2d 5, 21 n.17 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing only constitutional difficulties), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982) (same), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983). The courts pointed out that after objections had been raised
in the House that the proposed legislation was not limited to organized-crime defendants,
e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 35,204-05 (1970) (statements of Reps. Mikva and Poff), an amendment
was offered that would have made unlawful any person's being a "member of a Mafia or a
La Cosa Nostra organization," which the amendment would have defined. Id. at 35,343
(statement of Rep. Biaggi). After the constitutionality of status-based legislation was questioned, the House rejected the amendment. Id. at 35,343-46.
234. Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30, and Related ProposalsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1970) (state-
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the City of New York recommended that RICO be "sufficiently circumscribed so as to exclude from its scope those against whom it is
not directed. 2 3 5 The New York County Lawyers' Association
called the predicate acts "overly broad." 23 6 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the American Civil Liberties Union expressed
concern that although the OCCA was "justified by and aimed only
at organized crime, . . . its consequences are potentially much
more far-reaching . . . and the possibilities for abuse are manifold. 2 37 The ACLU advised with some prescience that "we cannot
rely alone on good intentions to prevent use of limited-purpose legislation in other contexts." 38
Several courts23 9 cited a floor speech by Senator McClellan,
RICO's sponsor, who acknowledged that the predicate acts reached
beyond organized-crime defendants. "It is impossible," the Senator
told his colleagues, "to draw an effective statute which reaches
most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not
include offenses commonly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." Moreover, "[t]he Senate report does not claim
. . .that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members
of organized crime, only that those offenses are characteristic of
'240
organized crime.
When the Senate Judiciary Committee reported in favor of
the OCCA, Senators Hart and Kennedy held to their view that the
Act reached "beyond organized criminal activity" and expressed
ment of John Mitchell, Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
235. Id. at 331 (communication of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Comm. on Federal Legislation).
236. Id. at 403 (communication of New York County Lawyers' Association, Comm. on
Federal Legislation).
237. Senate Hearings,supra note 201, at 456 (statement of Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liberties Union) (emphasis in original).
238. Id. The ACLU expressed the same view before the House Committee, testifying
that although the OCCA's "stated ultimate purpose is to destroy the power of organized
crime,... the bill goes far beyond that," and that RICO's predicate acts "go well beyond
those associated with racketeering." House Hearings,supra note 234, at 490, 499 (statement
of Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington office, American Civil Liberties Union).
239. E.g., Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D.D.C. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
240. 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970). Senator McClellan continued:
The listed offenses lend themselves to organized commercial exploitation, .. and experience has shown they are commonly committed by participants in organized crime.
That is all the title IX list of offenses purports to be, that is all the Senate report
claims it to be, and that is all it should be.
Id. In an effort to allay fears that "commission of such offenses by [persons outside organized crime] would subject them to proceedings under [RICO]," Senator McClellan stated
that RICO would reach only a person who "engages in a pattern of such violations." Id.
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dismay that the Act had not been "[a]mended to restrict its scope
solely to organized criminal activity.

'2 41

Later, when the House Ju-

diciary Committee concurred with its Senate counterpart, three
members dissented, complaining that RICO "makes no discrete
segregation of mobsters. It is a tool to be employed for all.

OCCA passed by wide margins in both
244
into law by the President.

houses2 43

' 24 2

The

and was signed

Viewing legislative history to confirm unambiguous statutory
language, courts found that Congress realized that its wide net
might catch nonracketeers but determined that this possibility was
a price worth paying in the battle against organized crime. Courts
concluded that the judicial role is not to question the wisdom of
legislation but to apply civil RICO in accordance with its language
and legislative history. 45
V. PROCEDURAL CONTROL IN CiviL RICO ACTIONS

Two related policy considerations underlie enactment of a private statutory cause of action such as civil RICO. Congress identifies conduct that it concludes is contrary to operative social norms,
and it identifies persons whom this conduct is likely to injure in a
way that makes private judicial redress desirable. If legislation
were an exact art, the statute's plaintiff class would consist of the
persons likely to be injured and its defendant class would consist
of the persons who engage in the conduct.
Part IV of this Article demonstrates, however, that legislative
definition of litigant classes, like other legislative pronouncements,
may suffer from imprecision. Whether the source of imprecision is
language, legislative intent, or legislative process, a statute ordinarily becomes the subject of litigation only after the parties have
concluded that their respective ascriptions of meaning hold some
prospect of success. Even so, judges report that in most cases stat241. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969).
242. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4007, 4083.
243. The Senate passed the OCCA by a vote of 73-1 (26 not voting), 116 CONG. REC.
972 (1970); the House passed the Act with minor amendments by a vote of 341-26 (63 not
voting), id. at 35,363. The Senate agreed by voice vote to accept the House amendments. Id.
at 36,296.
244. Id. at 37,264.
245. E.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1361 ("The legislature having spoken, it is not our role
to reassess the costs and benefits associated with the creation of a dramatically expansive,
and perhaps insufficiently discriminate, tool for combating organized crime.") (citation
omitted).
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utory interpretation yields a meaning that, in their judgment, best
accords with the record and pertinent legal materials. This Article,
however, studies the small percentage of statutory litigation in
which the legislature's signals appear so contradictory or otherwise
unilluminating that interpretation might lead the court not to a
determination of meaning but to equipoise. Before the sharply divided Supreme Court spoke in Sedima, a lower court could not
have been faulted for concluding that litigation requiring determination of a civil RICO litigant class qualified for membership in
the equipoise percentage of the docket.
When a court reaches equipoise in its effort to determine the
contours of a statutory litigant class, the court must look beyond
statutory language and legislative history to determine whether
Congress previously created a broad class advanced by one party
or a narrower one advanced by another. Among other sources, the
court should consider the control that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, taken as a whole, exercise on the conduct of litigation.
Hart's formulation would permit courts to consider procedural
control to guide the exercise of essentially legislative discretion.2 4 6
Under Dworkin's formulation, procedural control would lay claim
to status as a principle enjoying a time-honored sense of appropriateness derived from the positive reception that the Rules have
been accorded ever since their adoption in 1938; courts would evaluate the weight and importance of procedural control in relation to
the weight and importance of other extant principles.24 7
Civil RICO demonstrates the often conflicting considerations
that operate in equipoise cases in which the court must determine
the contours of a litigant class created by Congress. Resolution of
equipoise is likely to result in either overinclusion or underinclusion, each with its own effect on the general legislative goal, expressed in Rule 1, of securing "just, speedy, and inexpensive" civil
determinations.2 4s Because certain persons will be members of both
a broad and a narrower class, the effect depends on the "swing"
persons, who would be members of the first class but not the second. If the court resolves equipoise by defining a broad class, it
concludes that a just determination makes private redress available against a broad range of conduct. Breadth increases the possibility of including conduct outside the inarticulate Congress' in246.
247.
248.

See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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tendment, but it decreases the possibility of excluding conduct
within that intendment. Breadth also might swell the dockets and
impede efforts to maintain efficiency conducive to speed and inexpensiveness. On the other hand, definition of a narrower class
would restrict availability of private redress, perhaps advancing efficiency by reducing the dockets, but at the risk of excluding some
conduct within congressional intendment.
Under both the Hart and Dworkin formulations, the court at
equipoise rightfully may consider the reality that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure control the conduct of litigation because a
party may litigate and proceed to judgment only by complying
with their prescriptions. As this part V demonstrates, some actions
suffer dismissal for noncompliance while others proceed according
to these prescriptions. Litigation involving one or more swing persons thus would be controlled by, and proceed in accordance with,
prescriptions that Congress previously has approved for the orderly determination of civil actions. In equipoise cases in which
private redress against a broad range of conduct otherwise is considered just, procedural control thus would be an element supporting a determination that Congress created a broad litigant class.
Before the Supreme Court decided Sedima, civil RICO decisions illustrated the control that the Rules, taken as a whole, exercise on the conduct of litigation.
A.

Rule 8(a), (e): Failure to Provide Short and Plain
Statement of Claim

Consistent with the Rules' aim to encourage determinations on
the merits and not on technicality, Rule 8 calls for simplified notice pleading. By requiring that the pleading contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief, ' 24 9 the Rule controls an affirmative pleader's ability to invoke the judicial process. Each averment must be "simple, concise,
and direct. 2 10 The Supreme Court has held that an affirmative
pleader satisfies Rule 8 by providing "fair notice of what the...
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'251 Notice is fair if
the court and opponent sufficiently can determine whether a claim
has been stated, with further detail postponed until discovery.
What qualifies as "simple, concise, and direct" depends on the
249.
250.
251.

FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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circumstances, including the number and nature of claims and parties. A long, confusing, or redundant pleading may place an unfair
burden on the resources of both the court and the opponent. Absent dismissal on motion, the court or opponent may have to guess
what the pleader means to say, whether the action should proceed
and thus consume even greater resources, and how best to mount a
defense.
When a pleading is dismissed for failure to satisfy the Rule 8
simplicity requirement, the court usually grants leave to replead,
except in certain instances when the pleader has had previous opportunities to replead or when repleading would be fruitless. Leave
to replead was denied in Taylor v. Weissman.25 2 Two days after
the court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff Taylor filed a second complaint, which included a
civil RICO claim. According to the court, the second complaint
contained "page after page of rambling, pseudo-legalese allegations
which drift in and out of the realm of coherence and intelligibility. ' 253 The court found that plaintiff "woefully" had failed to satisfy Rule 8 and had "demonstrated his inability, or unwillingness,
'2 54
to submit a short plain statement of his claims.
B. Rule 9(b): Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity
A fraud claimant's ability to invoke the judicial process is controlled not only by Rule 8, but also by Rule 9(b), which requires
that "the circumstances constituting fraud . . . be stated with particularity. ' '255 The higher command of Rule 9(b) arises from the
rulemakers' perception, based on experience at common law and
under the codes, that fraud allegations hold special potential for
abuse and thus require closer judicial control. Rule 9(b) seeks to
control a fraud claimant's ability to injure the opponent by randomly charging misconduct involving moral turpitude. The Rule
252. No. 84-CV-357 (N.D.N.Y. June 14, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file). A motion to dismiss a civil RICO count for failure to satisfy the Rule 8 simplicity
requirement was denied in In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp.
1388, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
253. Taylor, No. 84-CV-357.
254. Id.
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Courts seek to harmonize Rule 9(b) with Rule 8. A fraud

averment passes muster if it contains a short and plain statement of the claim, but it must
state with particularity the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud, such as the time,
place, and contents of false representations; the identity of the person making the misrepresentation; and what was obtained or lost. E.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
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also seeks to control the claimant's ability to raise tenuous and
perhaps unprovable allegations, either with insufficient forethought
or with an eye toward inducing settlement from an opponent that
concludes, regardless of its assessment of the merits, that it can ill
afford the notoriety of a public trial. Finally, the Rule seeks to control the claimant's ability to assert nebulous claims that prevent
the opponent from adequately framing the answer, preparing for
discovery, or mounting a defense.
By 1981 broad interpretations of RICO suggested that little
semantic wizardry was needed to assert a civil RICO claim in ordinary fraud litigation, usually by alleging predicate acts of mail
fraud, wire fraud, or fraud in the sale of securities. When a predicate act sounds in fraud, courts have required civil RICO pleadings
to comply with Rule 9(b) and have dismissed claims that lack requisite particularity. 25 6 Saine v. A.I.A., Inc.,257 for example, was an
action by a former employee of defendant insurer who sought to
recover commissions allegedly due him on sales of defendant's policies. Defendant A.I.A. asserted civil RICO claims in its counterclaim against Saine and in its third-party complaint against
Saine's subsequent employer, National Health Insurance Company, a competing insurer. The counterclaim and third-party complaint each alleged that "NHI representatives" had committed
predicate acts of wire fraud by fraudulently misrepresenting
256. See, e.g., Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984); Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); McKee v.
Pope Ballard Shepard & Fowle, Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 927, 930-32 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Bennett v
E.F. Hutton Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547, 1560 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Carbone, Inc. v. Proctor
Ellison Co., 102 F.R.D. 951 (D. Mass. 1984); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 581, 584-85 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Gallagher v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 588 F. Supp. 108, 11112 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 168 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hellenic Lines, Ltd.
v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 248-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For representative decisions that de-

nied motions to dismiss civil RICO claims for failure to comply with Rule 9(b), see Seville
Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985); Banowitz v. State Exch. Bank, 600 F. Supp. 1466, 1469-70
(N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388,
1397-1400 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co, 581 F. Supp. 88, 97 n.20 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1070-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 241-44 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec.
Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 263-64 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476,
480-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 279-80 (D. Md.
1983); Haber v. Kobrin, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,259, at
96,161 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1983); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 94 F.R.D. 48, 51-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
257. 582 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Colo. 1984).
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A.I.A.'s financial condition in telephone calls to A.I.A. policyholders. 258 The court dismissed the counterclaim against Saine because
A.I.A. failed to allege that he was one of the representatives or that
he was responsible for their acts.259
C. Rule 12(e): Motion for a More Definite Statement
If a pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading," Rule 12(e)
permits the party to "move for a more definite statement before
interposing his responsive pleading. ' 26 0 When the assailed pleading
must satisfy only Rule 8, courts ordinarily view Rule 12(e) motions
with disfavor as being tools for delay and harassment or for seeking discovery at the pleading stage. Rule 12(e) holds a broader office, however, when the motion is directed against fraud averments,
which must satisfy not only Rule 8 but also the higher command of
Rule 9(b). Because Rule 9(b) provides no method for enforcing its
control, courts often look to Rule 12(e).
In Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc.,6 1 for example, minority shareholders of Durham Hosiery Mills sued after a majority
of voting shares had approved the North Carolina corporation's
merger into a Virginia corporation. The complaint alleged that defendants had controlled the shareholder vote after conspiring to
purchase a control bloc of Durham voting shares and after disseminating materially misleading disclosure. The court concluded that
the civil RICO count stated a claim "in a minimally sufficient manner" but ordered plaintiffs to file a more definite statement.2 62 The
court sensed, but was not certain, that plaintiffs had alleged predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and fraud in the sale of securities. "The Complaint sets out several transactions of securities
purchases and notices to plaintiffs via the mails," the court found,
but it "does not plainly identify which specific acts the plaintiffs
contend are RICO predicate acts . .. *"263 After plaintiffs served
the more definite statement, the court denied the individual defendants' motions to dismiss the civil RICO count for failure to state
a claim but granted the corporate defendant's motion on the
ground that it could not be both the "enterprise" and the "liable
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 1303.
Id.
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(e).
578 F. Supp. 342 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
Id. at 347 (citing 5 WRIGHT & MMLER, supra note 61, § 1378, at 773).
578 F. Supp. at 347.
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2 64

D. Rule 12(f): Motion to Strike
When a pleading satisfies Rule 8 (and any applicable subdivision of Rule 9) and otherwise states a claim or defense, Rule 12(f)
controls the pleader's ability to include certain extraneous allegations that might affect the conduct or outcome of the action. The
court is authorized, on motion by a party or on its own initiative,
to strike from a pleading "any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."2 6 5 Because
courts ordinarily view motions to strike (like motions for a more
definite statement) with disfavor as being tools for delay and harassment, orders to strike are the exception rather than the rule. As
one civil RICO court stated, "only allegations that are 'so unrelated to plaintiffs' claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as
a defense' should be stricken."2 6
The court granted defendants' motion to strike in Frogner v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.2 67 Merrill Lynch and
its broker and supervisor were charged with fraud and churning in
connection with plaintiff's account. The civil RICO count included
allegations that plaintiff had suffered emotional distress and had
incurred medical expenses. The court held that because these allegations did not concern injury to plaintiff's business or property,
they were not cognizable in a civil RICO claim.2 68
264. 592 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (M.D.N.C. 1984); see supra note 153 and accompanying
text; see also Kaplan, Civil RICO After Sedima: An Overview, in Cwv RICO LITIGATION
AFTER Sedima 43, 81-84 (ALI 1985); Nathan & Bograd, RICO Litigation's New Battleground: "Pattern"and "Enterprise,"id. at 143, 160-68. Other civil RICO decisions granting
Rule 12(e) motions include Muscarello v. Regency Federal Savings, No. 83 C 4001 (N.D. Ill.
May 1, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Gallagher v. Canon U.S.A.,
Inc., 588 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 n.10
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983) (suggesting that on remand defendants
might tender, and the district court might consider, a Rule 12(e) motion). A decision denying a motion seeking a more definite statement of the civil RICO claim was In re Catanella
and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
265. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
266. In re Catanella,583 F. Supp. at 1400 (quoting EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.
Supp. 643, 644 (D. Colo. 1982)).
267. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,504, at 96,930 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 1983); see also Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,963, at 90,805 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 11, 1985) (Rule 12(f) motion to
strike civil RICO request for punitive damages granted).
268. Frogner, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ( 99,P)504, at
96,930; see supra note 152 and accompanying text. Decisions denying Rule 12(f) motions in
civil RICO actions include In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp.
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E. Rule 15(a): Motion to Amend Pleading
Rule 15(a) controls the parties' ability to amend their pleadings. After a brief period during which a party may amend once as
a matter of course, amendment may be made only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party. Consistent with the
Rules' philosophy that procedure is not an end in itself but rather
a means to reach and determine the merits, Rule 15(a) instructs
that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. "269 The
policy of liberal amendment, however, is not boundless. The Supreme Court has held that leave to amend may be denied for such
reasons as "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment
,,270

Courts frequently have granted leave to amend pleadings to
add or restate civil RICO claims 271 but have denied leave when undue delay has been found.2 72 Leave to amend was denied in
Gordon v. Terry,27 3 in which plaintiff alleged that he had invested
approximately four million dollars in five Florida real estate syndications. After substantial profits failed to materialize, he filed suit
in 1976 against the syndication's promoters and sellers, alleging
federal securities law violations. The Fifth Circuit ordered the dis1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 94 F.R.D. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
269. FED. R CIv. P. 15(a).
270. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
271. E.g., Peters Fabrics, Inc. v. Textiles Fabricato de Nicar., S.A., No. 77 Civ. 1774
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); In re Olympia
Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., No. 77 C 1206 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 31, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 739-40 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
272. E.g., Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 931 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (motion to

amend made one day before trial); Darms v. McCulloch Oil Corp., 720 F.2d 490, 494 (8th
Cir. 1983) (four years after original complaint, motion to file fourth amended complaint
made one month before trial); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 105 F.R.D.
553 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (motion to amend made after court of appeals reversed district court
decision, more than four and one-half years after trial); Peil v. Speiser, No. 82-1289 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (motion to amend made

almost three years after original complaint and after "vigorous" discovery); Morrison v.
Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 743, 744 (D.D.C. 1984) (almost two years after original

complaint and after discovery, motion to amend made three months before trial); Sanders v.
Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945, 951-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (motion to file third amended
complaint made almost three years after original complaint), aff'd per curiam, 730 F.2d 910
(2d Cir. 1984).
273. 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
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trict court to dismiss the complaints, with leave to amend, for failure to provide a short and plain statement of the claim. The court
of appeals noted that "[t]he various complaints, amendments,
amended amendments, amendments to amended amendments, and
other related papers are anything but short, totaling over 4,000
pages, occupying 18 volumes, and requiring a hand truck or cart to
274
move."
On remand the undaunted plaintiff filed a first set of amended
complaints, which the district court dismissed for failure to provide a short and plain statement of the claim. His second set apparently suffered the same disposition before the district court
found the third set adequate. Defendants then moved for summary
judgment. One day before the hearing on the motion-six years
after the original complaint-Gordon submitted a fourth set of
amended complaints, which sought to allege a civil RICO claim for
the first time. The district court denied leave to amend. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that "[a]llowing amendment
to the defendants and would
at this late date would be prejudicial
' 75
not serve the ends of justice.

F. Rule 23: Judicial Control of Class Actions
When plaintiffs sue as a class, Rule 23(c)(1) requires the court,
"[a]s soon as practicable" after commencement of the action, to
determine whether to certify the class. 276 The court may certify the

proposed class; it may certify a refashioned class; or it may deny
certification and require plaintiffs to proceed, if at all, individually
or in accordance with the Rules' other joinder provisions.
When a would-be class member's financial interest is relatively
small, denial of certification may be a significant control because
proceeding as a class may be the only economically sensible approach. Regardless of the size of a member's interest, however, certification may provide plaintiffs a valuable bargaining chip by
pressuring the defendant into a settlement to avoid the prospect of
expensive discovery, protracted proceedings, and potentially crushing liability. On the other hand, if the court denies certification,
the same defendant, feeling no more than the ordinary pressure of
adversary litigation, might be encouraged to contest an individual
274. Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 744-45 (5th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
275. 684 F.2d at 739.
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
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plaintiff's allegations. It is little wonder, then, that litigants and
their lawyers often look on class certification as the most important event in the entire action and hold their collective breaths as
the court proceeds to its determination.
Some civil RICO courts have denied class certification or have
certified refashioned classes.
Certification was denied in Wilcox
Development Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. 78 The
named plaintiffs had obtained a loan from the Bank with interest
at prime rate plus two percent. They claimed that in making the
loan, the Bank and its holding company fraudulently had misrepresented the meaning of "prime rate." Alleging that the defendants
had mailed inflated interest demands, and thus had committed
predicate acts of mail fraud, plaintiffs asserted a civil RICO claim.
They then moved to certify a class consisting of "all borrowers
from [the Bank] who have been charged interest on an obligation
pursuant to an evidence of indebtedness utilizing the term 'prime
rate' or words having the equivalent meaning. 2 7 9 Plaintiffs estimated that the Bank had made at least 6500 loans based on the
prime rate during the relevant period. 8 0
The court held that the proposed class failed to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3). Because a class member could recover only by proving
that it had the same understanding of "prime rate" as the named
plaintiffs, common questions of law or fact did not predominate
over individual questions. After finding that the need to take individual proof of injury and damages would have meant that "trial of
just the damages portion of [the case] would take almost three
years, ' 28 1 the court held that a class action was not superior to
other methods of adjudication.
G. Rules 26-37: Judicial Control of Discovery
Once the pleadings are closed, discovery normally is conducted
by the parties. The court exercises control, however, in the discovery conference and in situations in which a dispute arises or in
277. See, e.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 54, 73
(D.N.J. 1984); Waldo v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,170
(W.D. Pa. July 12, 1984); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1326 (N.D. IIl. 1983).
A proposed civil RICO class was certified in Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch.
Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
278. 97 F.R.D. 440 (D. Or. 1983). Wilcox disposed of certification motions in two cases
whose facts and legal issues were similar. This discussion states the facts of one case.
279. Id. at 443.
280. Id. at 445.
281. Id. at 447 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

1534

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1477

which the rights of a party or witness otherwise might be compromised. The court may act on motion; or it may act on its own initiative,28 2 as the court apparently did in Spencer Companies v.
28 3
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.
Defendant Agency had purchased approximately 36.2% of
Spencer's outstanding shares on the open market. 284 The complaint alleged that defendant's purchases violated federal securities
laws and civil RICO. The court denied Agency's motion to dismiss
the civil RICO count for failure to state a claim. The court stayed
discovery pending its further order, however, on the ground that
RICO's "very breadth and vagueness" obliges courts to "assume
some control of such counts in civil actions. ' 28 5 The court particularly was troubled that when a plaintiff seeks to prove a pattern of
racketeering activity, "a defendant may be exposed to pretrial discovery of every aspect of its business for a ten-year period. '2 6 The
stay remained in effect for nearly thirteen months.2 87
H.

Rule 11: Sanctions for Abuse of the Civil Litigation Process

The American Rule precludes civil litigants from recovering
attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory authorization or enforceable contract. Under the bad faith exception, however, federal
courts have discretion to assess attorneys' fees as punishment for
abuse of the litigation process. 28 8 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee notes.
283. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981). Courts hearing civil RICO actions frequently have stayed or otherwise controlled disbovery pending determination of pleading-stage motions. E.g., Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d
478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 1983); Grado v.
Gross, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,660, at 99,338 n.2 (D. Mass. Aug.
20, 1984); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Mahoney, No. 82-C-2283 (N.D. m. July 30, 1984)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Bourdages v. Metals Ref., Ltd., No. 84 Civ.
743 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Friedlander v.
Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (N.D. Ga. 1983), afl'd, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985); In re
Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D. 616, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (D. Mass. 1982); Maryland v.
Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Md. 1980).
284. Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) T 98,301, at 91,894 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1981).
285. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,217.
286. Id.
287. The court vacated the stay in an unreported bench ruling. Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-a-Car, Inc., No. 11-2097-H (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 1982) (docket entry of bench ruling concerning docketed motion No. 95-102 and transcript of hearings at 17).
288. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (In bad-faith exception cases, "the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of course, punitive.").
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v. Wilderness Society289 in 1975, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
federal courts' "unquestionable" inherent equitable power to assess
attorneys' fees when the losing party has "'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' "290 Two years earlier
the Court had clarified that bad faith might be found either in the
decision to commence the action or "in the conduct of the litigation."'2 91 Congress augmented the courts' inherent equitable power
by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which is directed against abuse by
counsel. When counsel "so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously," this section authorizes the court to
require the offender "to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct. ' 292 In addition, Congress expanded on the bad faith exception in its 1983 amendment to Rule 11.293
Ever since its adoption in 1938, Rule 11 has required good
faith in pleading and has held out the prospect of sanctions for
violation. The Rule was amended effective August 1, 1983, however, after the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules concluded that
it had been ineffective in controlling abuse, partly because of judicial reluctance to impose sanctions.2 9 4 The language of the original
Rule applied only to counsel, operated only against pleadings, and
289. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
290. Id. at 258-59 (quoting F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)). A year later the Court emphasized that an assessment of attorneys' fees should be based on a "factual predicate" of bad faith; the mere fact that the
losing party has lost is insufficient to support a finding that the party acted in bad faith.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1976).
291. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15.
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). From its enactment in 1813 until 1980, § 1927 permitted
recovery of only "costs." In 1980 the Supreme Court held that costs recoverable under that
section did not include attorneys' fees. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-61
(1980). Later that year Congress amended § 1927 to provide expressly for recovery of expenses and attorneys' fees, as well as costs. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1154, 1156.
To be distinguished from § 1927 are various statutory provisions, including civil RICO,
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), that authorize mandatory or discretionary award of attorneys' fees
without regard to abuse of the litigation process. E.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 260 n.33 (citing provisions). These provisions generally are intended
to encourage private enforcement of the statute concerned.
293. For discussions of the relationship among the sources of judicial authority to
overcome the American Rule, see Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997
(1983); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976); and Note, Liability for
Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND.L. REv.743 (1980).
294. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.
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did not express clearly either the required standard of good faith
or the range of sanctions a court might impose for violation. In
1980 one writer found only fifteen reported decisions that had held
pleadings to violate the Rule. 95
"[B]y building upon and expanding" the bad faith exception, 29 amended Rule 11 seeks to control abuse of the litigation
process that escapes control by other Rules. Amended Rule 11 expressly applies to counsel, represented parties, and parties appearing pro se; it operates against motions and other papers as well as
pleadings; and it is more explicit than its predecessor in defining
the standard of good faith and the range of available sanctions,
which for the first time expressly includes awarding attorneys' fees.
Signature of counsel or a party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass2 9 7or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.

The federal bench greeted amended Rule 11 with less than
unanimous approval, 298 but courts since have used their newly articulated authority to impose sanctions, including assessment of attorneys' fees, against litigants and counsel. 299 By assessing attorneys' fees on findings of objective rather than subjective bad faith,
recent decisions have given the Rule greater impact as a control.30 0
The bad faith exception has found a place in civil RICO litigation. A few courts have denied motions for Rule 11 sanctions
295.
296.

Note, supra note 293, at 756 n.127 (citing cases).
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes.

297.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

298. Compare Weinstein, Reflections on the 1983 Amendments to U.S. Rules of Civil
Procedure,190 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 3 ("I do not want to hear arguments about
lawyers' good faith. Unless a lawyer is stupid (and few are) there is good reason for what he
or she does . . . . Please do not waste our time with this kind of motion. We will not like
it.") with Mansfield, Compliance with 1983 Changes in Rules of Civil Procedure, 190
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 3 ("Judicial compliance is ... urged not simply upon the
basis that judges are expected to respect and enforce the law of the land regardless of their
personal views but also on the additional ground that these changes in the law can hardly be
disregarded as hasty or ill-conceived.") (footnote omitted).
299. See, e.g., Vairo, Analysis of August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in 1 CIVIL PRACTICE AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 55, 72, 76-82 (ALI Aug. 1985); Strasser, Sanctions: A Sword is Sharpened,
NAT'L L.J. Nov. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
300. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d
Cir. 1985).
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against civil RICO claimants, holding that in view of civil RICO's
uncertain reach before the Supreme Court decided Sedima, a court
could not conclude that the claims were made in bad faith. e
Other courts, however, have held out the prospect of sanctions to
deter the sort of abuse that would invite their imposition.320 In
Friedlander v. Nims, 03 for example, the civil RICO complaint
named Timex Corporation as one of several defendants but failed
to allege that Timex had committed any wrongdoing. When the
failure was pointed out, plaintiff made no effort to include allegations in an amended complaint or to drop Timex as a party. After
finding it "hard to believe" plaintiff's explanation of why the complaint named Timex,30 4 the court granted Timex's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Calling civil RICO "a cause of
action that is subject to abuse,"3 0 5 the court granted leave to replead, but cautioned counsel that "the strictest compliance with
Rule 11 . . .will be expected if amendment is made. The Court
will not hesitate to enter sanctions for false pleadings."3 0
In civil RICO actions in which abuse of the litigation process
has been found, courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions. In Gordon
v. Heimann,3 07 for example, the Eleventh Circuit approved awards
of attorneys' fees against both the civil RICO plaintiff and his attorney.3 0 8 In 1980, after he already had brought twenty-one actions
301. See, e.g., Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Assocs., 591 F. Supp.
1408, 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Hudson v. LaRouche, 579 F. Supp. 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
302. See, e.g., Club Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 598 F. Supp. 734, 737 n.8
(N.D. Ill.
1984); Pete Thoesen Tractor & Equip. Repair Co. v. City of Chicago, 101 F.R.D.
734, 735 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Sane v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299, 1306, 1309 n.5 (D. Colo.
1984); Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Taylor
v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 683 (N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig.,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,537, at 97,118 (W.D. Okla. July
28, 1983); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 745 (N.D. IM. 1981);
Katzen v. Continental Ill. Bank & Trust Co., No. 80-C-1378 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 14, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
303. 571 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 810 (11th Cir. 1985).
304. 571 F. Supp. at 1191.
305. Id. at 1194.
306. Id. at 1194-95. On appeal plaintiff asserted that he chose not to amend the complaint because the district court's warnings about Rule 11 sanctions had "intimidated" him.
755 F.2d at 814 n.5. "Without expressly endorsing the warnings," the Eleventh Circuit held
that the warnings did not justify failure to amend. Id.
307. 715 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1983).
308. Id. at 533. Other civil RICO decisions imposing Rule 11 sanctions include WSB
Elec. Co. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate System, 103 F.R.D. 417, 421 (N.D. Cal.
1984); Financial Fed'n, Inc. v. Ashkenazy, [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,489, at 98,441 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 1983); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1385
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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arising from the same events, plaintiff Gordon brought action
number twenty-two by filing a complaint charging thirty-eight defendants with civil RICO violations. The district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied the motion for
leave to amend. The persistent Gordon then brought action number twenty-three by filing an almost identical complaint charging
forty-four defendants with civil RICO violations, a complaint that
the district court dismissed on res judicata grounds. Defendants in
the two civil RICO actions then moved for awards of attorneys'
fees on the ground that plaintiff had pursued the litigation in bad
faith. Based on its inherent power, the original Rule 11, and section 1927, the district court granted the motions of all defendants
named in the second civil RICO action. The court awarded attorneys' fees to only one defendant named in the first civil RICO action, however, and denied the other defendants' motions as
untimely.30 9
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's awards but
held that all defendants' motions had been timely in the first action. In remanding the cause for consideration of the merits of the
motions previously denied, the panel observed that "[t]he present
purely frivolous actions are precisely the kind of suits which neces3' 10
sitate a bad faith exception to the American rule.
VI.

CONCLUSION

One commentator recently observed that judges serve as
teachers, with courtrooms as their classrooms. 1 ' When Sedima rejected proposed limits on membership in the litigant classes, the
Supreme Court delivered the "lesson" that "RICO is to be read
broadly. 3 12 That lesson doubtlessly will be instructive during the
expected proliferation of civil RICO actions. Sedima and the preceding five years of lower court confusion, however, hold broader
lessons about statutory interpretation that transcend the immediate statute concerned.
In an era of heightened sensitivity to finite judicial budgets
and resources, dozens of inconsistent civil RICO decisions teach
once again about the burden that rampant legislative imprecision
casts on the judicial system. Imprecision is virtually inevitable
309.
310.
311.
(1982).
312.

Gordon, 715 F.2d at 533-34.
Id. at 539.
Ward, The Federal Judges: Indispensable Teachers, 61 Tax. L. Rv. 43, 46
105 S. Ct. at 3286; see supra note 158.

CIVIL RICO

1985]

1539

when communication depends on language, intent, and the foibles
of the legislative process. Sedima's broader lessons, however, emanate not from the presence of imprecision but from its degree. In
the relatively brief span of five years, courts found civil RICO so
imprecise as to preclude consensus about the contours of the litigant classes. Before the Supreme Court spoke through a hairbreadth majority, judges reviewing the countervailing positions
compared in part IV could have reached equipoise.
In the age of statutes, judges report that legislative imprecision invites equipoise with sufficient frequency"'3 to insure continued discussion about the way courts may tip the scale consistent
with historically developed notions about legislative supremacy
and the judiciary's constitutional role. Jurisprudence provides no
ready answer. Until the twentieth century, in fact, mainstream jurisprudence did not perceive courts as exercising judgment that
might produce equipoise. Judges were perceived as finders and declarers of preexisting legislative meaning, not as agents whose
judgmental processes created capacity for lawmaking.3 14 As the
role of judicial judgment won wider recognition in this century,
most writers embraced Hart's formulation that courts may resolve
equipoise by exercising essentially legislative discretion.3 15 Now
Dworkin has challenged that formulation by positing that law consists not only of rules such as statutes but also of principles that
preclude courts from rightfully exercising discretion on matters of
3 16
law.
The control that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, taken
as a whole, exercise on the conduct of litigation is relevant to resolution when a court reaches equipoise in the effort to determine
whether Congress created a broad litigant class advanced by one
party or a narrower one advanced by another. 17 Rule 1 expresses
the general legislative goal of securing "just, speedy, and inexpensive" civil determinations. The reality is that litigation involving
members of the litigant classes will be controlled by the Rules' prescriptions, which have prior congressional approval for the orderly
determination of civil actions. In equipoise cases in which private
redress against a broad range of conduct otherwise is considered
just, both the Hart and Dworkin formulations would view proce313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

30-38, 72 and accompanying text.
73-102 and accompanying text.
41-51 and accompanying text.
52-59 and accompanying text.
60-64, 246-310 and accompanying text.
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dural control as an element supporting a determination that Congress created a broad litigant class.

